FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS

SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION
SECURITY INDEX
FILE NUMBER: 100-358086
SECTION : 32

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
NOTICE

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Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Mr. [Redacted]
FROM: Mr. [Redacted]

DATE: December 21, 1954

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX LIST

The Security Index list as of December 15, 1954 has been prepared. One copy is attached herewith for transmittal to the SAC, Quantico, for retention in his personal custody with the other vital records maintained at the FBI Academy.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That this memorandum and attached list be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, marked Personal and Confidential, Registered, Return Receipt Requested.

2. That upon receipt, the SAC, Quantico, place the attached list with the other vital records maintained at Quantico, personally destroy by burning the old Security Index list in his possession and note herein that such action has been taken.

3. That thereafter, this memorandum be returned to the Bureau, marked for my attention.

Attachment

[Redacted]

64 Jan 5
REVIEW OF SECURITY INDEX CRITERIA

Reference is made to my interim memorandum of 1/13/54, reflecting the steps taken by me concerning the re-evaluation of the criteria currently being used to place a person on the security index, to determine whether they are sound or should be modified in any respect.

Observations submitted by the SACs at New York, Newark, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Washington Field, were carefully discussed by me with Hessar. In a memorandum from Mr. PROGRAM, a complete analysis of these observations is made. The memoranda from these five SACs follow the general practice now in use regarding placing individuals on the security index.

The Newark Division suggested that those individuals whose names are placed on the security index because of espionage activity should be considered, at the time of an emergency, from the standpoint of permitting such subjects to remain at large, if such action would serve the interests of our espionage investigations. Newark suggests maintenance of a separate list of such individuals, so that careful evaluation can be made in time of an emergency.

The Bureau is directing Newark's attention to page 36 of Section 37-C of the Manual of Instructions, wherein provision is made for placing such persons in the Espionage Subdivision of the Special Section of the Security Index. It is also being suggested to Newark that if the Newark Office has such cases not presently in such a subdivision, these cases should be brought to the attention of the Bureau, with appropriate recommendations.

Newark then makes the observation that 100 of their security index subjects are housewives, "some of whom were placed in the security index because they were uncooperative during interviews. The Executives Conference, on 12/14/54, unanimously recommended and you approved, the Domestic Intelligence Division's practice of considering an uncooperative attitude on the part of a subject, an interfering or significant factor in retaining his name in the
Though it is very unlikely that the Domestic Intelligence Division has ever approved placing a person on the security index, because they were uncooperative when interviewed, Newark is being instructed to call to the Bureau's attention any cases wherein Newark recommended placing on the security index a person who was uncooperative when interviewed, there being no other subversive indications which would warrant inclusion in the security index under the established criteria.

A letter is being directed to the Los Angeles Office calling attention to its observation that, as a general rule, a person should not be included on the security index merely because of his refusal to identify others who participated with him in subversive activities, and pointing out to Los Angeles that the uncooperative attitude on the part of a subject must be considered, along with all other facts developed in the case, and the extent of his known subversive activities, in arriving at a conclusion as to whether such subject should be included on the security index. This point again pertains to the Executive Conference consideration of the matter of interviews.

The memoranda submitted by the Washington Field, New York and San Francisco Divisions did not contain any comments requiring answer.

Attached is a list of 95 files reviewed for the purpose of determining whether it was felt these persons were properly included in the security index. In my memorandum of 12/13/c9, I pointed out that I had raised two points concerning types of cases for consultation with Bureau. One concerned the soundness of the reasoning employed by the field in recommending, and the Bureau in approving, the placing of these persons on the security index. For the sake of discussion and analysis, I raised certain questions in the cases captioned

After oral discussion, I had Mr. [name] prepare an analysis memorandum, justifying the inclusion of these subjects in the security index. I find that these persons have been properly included in the Security Index.

In the case, I raised the question as to why the subject had not been interviewed, in view of a lack of information
as to Community activity since 1949. The Conference on
12/12/54 recommended, and you approved, that subject
concerning which we have been unable to develop subservient activities
subsequent to January 1, 1949, should be required to be interverted
for the purpose of determining their present attitude, to provide a
further basis for evaluation as to whether they should continue to
be retained on the security index. An SIC letter is being sent to
the field covering this point.

In the cases captioned with alias ( ), and
with alias ( ),
I dictated memoranda dated 12/20/54 to Mr.
pertaining to discrepancies and weaknesses in either reporting or inter-
viewing, in connection with the results of contacts with informants.
The Milwaukee, New York and Albany offices are being instructed to
explain the discrepancies noted and indicate whether there was an
inadequacy of reporting or interviewing; also to make any administra-
tive recommendations indicated. As soon as these explanations are
received they will be carefully reviewed and recommendations concern-
ing administrative action will be made.

In the case of,
I dictated a memorandum 12/16/54 to Mr., pointing out that
there had been a failure on the part of the San Diego office to
submit a summary report which was due in January, 1955. The
San Diego Office has been requested to submit explanation for
failure to prepare this report, and the Domestic Intelligence
Division was asked to justify its failure to follow up this case.

The Domestic Intelligence Division has pointed out,
in a memorandum dated 12/31/54, that the
case is in a
closed status, and for the Bureau to follow up those cases would
require a tickler on each security index subject wherein the case
had been closed, which would require more than 26,000 ticklers.
The Domestic Intelligence Division pointed out that the Conference
on 10/19/54, approved an instruction to the field to
follow cases for the yearly summary report by administrative ticklers,
and recommended that during field inspections, the inspectors check
to see whether those cases were being properly followed.

I believe the Domestic Intelligence Division's explanation
is acceptable. Upon receipt of explanation from the San Diego
Office, consideration will be given as to any administrative action
which need be taken as to their failure to submit the report.

- 3 -
ith reference to the Director's Instruction that the
should be prepared and sent to the
criteria and listed for

of the Internal Security Division of the
Department, stated that it would be the best way
to be in the field and present the
the Department will
indicate clearly that it is using the same criteria as used
by the FBI. Upon receipt of this
will consult with
the Department as to the Department's thinking in applying these
criteria, using as a basis the

OBSERVATIONS:
From the foregoing review, it is my conclusion that the
criteria are adequate, are sound, and need no modification at this
time. It may be necessary to make modifications from time to time
in the future, depending upon changing conditions. This is
evidenced by the fact that the Domestic Intelligence Division
recently presented to the Executive Conference a modification
requiring the field to interview persons on the security index
concerning whom no evidence had been developed reflecting
subversive activities since January, 1948. The primary thing
we realize is that the Department is aware of and approves of
the criteria being used by the FBI. Steps are presently being taken
to assure this. It is further believed important to continue to
insist that the Department revise the adjudicative process pertaining
to those individuals placed on the security index.

As indicated in the body of this memorandum, I find two
files referring to any of either reporting or inserting
and explanations are being requested from the field. I plan to
discuss before the Inspector's Conference, January 4, 1958, the
necessity for the Inspectors carefully reviewing files in the
field for any indications of inadequate reporting and/or inter-
viewing and emphasizing at the inspection conferences with field
agents the need for being most thorough in the interviewing and
reporting of results of contacts with informants. It obviously
does very little good to develop a large number of informants
unless these informants are "thickly dry" of information of value
in their possession concerning subversive activities.

I also plan to include in the talk on investigation
techniques which I will be making before the Inspectors training
groups three case points, with a view to endeavoring to improve
the field handling of these informants.

-4-
When reports from the field of our functions reveal the inadequacies above referred to, appropriate recommendations will be made concerning any deficiencies noted.

ACTION: For your information.
(1) CONTACTS WITH EMPLOYERS -- At a recent conference of industrial officials and government representatives, a representative of a large manufacturing company which handles military contracts, commented that it was his understanding that certain employees of his company

who were under investigation by the FBI had continued to be employed by his company at our request in order to make their whereabouts readily available to the FBI.

Further inquiry into this matter established that the industrial official was in error and that no such requests had been made of his company and no such arrangements existed.

Nevertheless, I want to again emphasize that no Special Agent should either directly or by inference indicate to any employer or employer's representative that an employee should be retained as a matter of convenience to the FBI or to assist us in our investigation.

In connection with security-type investigations in your area, the Bureau is holding you responsible to see that there is no misunderstanding by employers and plant officials as to Bureau policy on this subject matter. It should be made clear that the FBI can make no recommendations regarding what security measures, if any, concerning the employee should be taken by the company and that the FBI makes no request as to either separation or continued employment of the employee.

This matter should be discussed with all Special Agents of your office and the contents of SAC Letter 68, Series 1952, (J), dated July 15, 1952, should be thoroughly reviewed.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director
December 27, 1954

PROPOSED CHANGES
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
SECTION 870

Page 27a - The following changes should be made immediately following the heading (a) Security Index Subjects. The first paragraph should be amended to read as follows:

I. Security Index subjects who have defected from a subversive movement.

The following paragraph should be inserted as the second paragraph:

Security Index subjects who have not been reported engaged in subversive activities since January 1, 1959, must be interviewed unless there are compelling reasons dictating against an interview in individual cases. In the latter circumstances, each such case should be called to the specific attention of the Bureau, together with the facts rendering an interview undesirable or impossible. Such authority must be procured for these interviews in accordance with 67C.61(7)(a), below.

The third paragraph should be amended to read as follows:

Individuals included in the Security Index are removed at such times as it is definitely indicated that their activities no longer warrant their inclusion in the Index because of defection from and resulting inactivity in a subversive movement.
From 5:15 p.m. to 6:40 p.m. on December 27, 1954, Section Chief Supervisor and discussed with the Department the application of criteria used by the Department and the FBI to place or retain individuals on the Security Index. You will recall that Mr. previously stated that the Department was using the same criteria as the FBI. Today, the Department had sent the Bureau a memorandum today stating that the Department used the same criteria as the Bureau.

In opening the discussion I stated that it was, of course, important that the reasoning behind the application of the criteria in Security Index cases should be similar in the Department and the FBI and we were desirous of discussing this with the Department. I pointed out that the Department had reviewed over 3,000 Security Index cases and had approved the retention of the subjects of these cases on the Security Index. I told Mr. that as we had previously repeatedly pointed out to the Department, we feel that the Department should review all Security Index cases, and that we would continue to hold this viewpoint until the Department would review all cases and this was an appropriate matter.

I pointed out that recently the Department had reviewed the case of and had expressed the opinion that he should be removed from the Security Index, which we did. However, as a starting point, I told and we would like to have the Department's reasoning in the case. We went over the salient points in the case, namely, that a known Soviet agent, had introduced a Soviet superior in the 1930's, although there was no indication that knew the purpose of the meeting or that accepted an assignment from the Soviet; that Dr. had strongly identified as the individual visited by and his wife, , and her mother, at home in 1946 and that the had praised as an individual friendly to the Communist Party (CP) and of value as a good friend of party movement and "it was good to have him in the position he was in"; that had associated with CP members, although he claimed this to be
a social way only; that 

...had attended a CP meeting, although he explained this by saying it had not been identified as such; that he was not fully cooperative when interviewed by agents and first denied registration in the American Labor Party for a period of 5 years, but later admitted same.

Mr. ...who had made the decision for the Department in the case, stated that from a careful review of the reports in the case there was no showing of actual Communist activities on the part of ...and, therefore, the allegations by the stood alone with no supporting data. ...said that he felt that should not be on the Government payroll, but that this was a matter for the Loyalty Board to decide; however, ...felt that there was no definite showing that ...was a potential danger in the event of an emergency. It was pointed out to Mr. ...and Mr. ...that the significant factor in the case was the identification by ...of ...as the individual to whom the remarks of the ...applied; the significance of which lay in the espionage or potential sabotage field rather than Communist activities; that is what the ...allege, he would be in a position in an emergency to perform sabotage or espionage at the Brooklyn Navy Yard where he has a sensitive position. There was considerable discussion of the various factors involved in this case; however, we did not attempt to argue the case or change the Department's position. We stated that we wanted the Department's reasoning as it might affect other cases on the Security ...Mr. ...stated that in his opinion there were no principles laid down in the Department's decision on the case, that the Department's decision had been arrived at in the main from the lack of Communist activities on the part of ...

OBSERVATION:

Insofar as the ...case is concerned, I personally feel that the Department reached its conclusion first, through a failure to recognize the espionage and sabotage potentials in the case and second, as a result of the Loyalty Board hearing which had already ruled that was eligible for continued employment. We are continuing the investigation on a special basis for the purpose of developing any possible additional facts which the Department should further consider in the case.
We further discussed with Nesara, and in line with Executive Conference Memorandum dated December 14, 1954, the policy we are following regarding uncooperative interviews as a factor to retain or place individuals on the Security Index subjects and Index. We advised that we interview Security Index subjects and Indexes. We advised that the interviewee make specific reasons, such as: To develop information to cause disruption within the CP; to ascertain the attitude and current activities of the subject. We stated that where the subject is this appears to be necessary. We stated that where the subject is completely uncooperative with the Government or where the subject indicates positively that he is still active as a Communist or on the other hand where he is completely cooperative, there is no problem as to the action to be taken. However, in between those extremes we have persons who upon interview fall into the following three categories: A. Interviews where the subject is an entirely uncooperative agent; B. Interviews where the subject cooperates partly by admitting his past Communist activities, but refuses to discuss other information in his possession concerning the CP; C. Interviews wherein subjects pretend to cooperate by lying and to the interviewing agent as borne out by definite information in our files.

Mr. Foley was advised that the Bureau is following the policy of considering interviews in the above three categories as decisive factors to retain or place on the Security Index providing, of course, that other information developed during the investigation warrants such action. In other words, if investigation has developed such activity as past or present, on the part of the subject, or his activities, past or present, or if he is interviewed to bring his activities up to date or to provide an additional factor for consideration we consider interviews resulting along lines of A, B and C above as a factor in retaining or placing an individual on the Security Index.

Nesara, Foley and Doherty were in complete agreement with the Bureau in this respect. I told them we would verify in writing our discussion on the subject of interviews in order that the Department can consider this during their review of Security Index cases and that we would state in our memorandum that Nesara, Foley and Doherty agreed with the policy set forth above.
ACTIVATION

We are drafting a memorandum to the Attorney General with copies to Rogers and Tompkins along this line.
PROGRAM FOR APPLICATION AND DETENTION OF PERSONS
CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum of December 19, 1954, set forth, in
accordance with your request, the general criteria or standards
utilized in determining whether or not an individual should be
included on the list of persons to be considered for apprehen-
sion in an emergency under the above-mentioned program.

The FBI has continued and continues to conduct inquiries
with subjects of security type investigations where the
investigations are primarily for the purpose of determining the
potential dangerousness of the individual. These investigations
are essentially centered around three main goals: to develop
information within the Communist Party or other subversive
organizations; to further disrupt the activities of
subversive organizations; and to assist in a current
evaluation of the potential dangerousness of the particular
subject.

There is the subject of one of these investigations.

Where investigation is completed and cooperation of the government
and furnishes all information in his possession and detests
the government, or where the subject is uncooperative and
refused continued Communist or subversive control, there is
no problem in so far as the Security Index is concerned. In
the final instance the subject in removed from the Security
Index and the second instance he is placed or retained on
the Security Index. Between these two extreme, interviews
refusals of subjects may be broken down into three types,
as follows:

1. Interviews where the subject is entirely uncooperative, such as refusing even to talk to the
interviewing agency.

2. Interviews where a subject cooperates
   partially by surrendering his own past Communist or
   other subversive activities, but refuses to identify
   his associates in the Communist Party or other
   subversive organizations and refuses to disclose other
   information in his possession concerning such organiza-
   tions.

3. Interviews where a subject cooperates fully by
   surrendering his past Communist or other subversive
   activities, his associates in the Communist Party or other
   subversive organizations, and information in his pos-
   session concerning such organizations.
This Bureau has followed the policy of considering any interview falling within the above three categories as a factor to be considered in connection with selecting or eliminating a subject's name on the security index. In other words, if investigation has developed substantial circumstantial, past or present, on the part of a subject, and if he is interviewed to relate his activities up to date or to indicate an additional factor for consideration, we consider interviews in the above three categories as a factor in retaining or placing an individual on the security index. Our policy in this matter takes into account Communist Party information on its members that, where necessary, they admit their past Communist activities in an effort to avoid the consequences of the FBI. We also take into account the Communist Party's "sleepers" program whereby Communist members are instructed to Glance outside themselves initially from Communist Party activities and remain in abeyance until such time as the Party may need to call upon them for action. In addition, in this connexion of the Communist Party's "organization" program whereby Communist Party members are publicly known as being and instructed to assume positions in industry, and elsewhere, and in so doing, to remain aloof from Communist activities in order that when the appropriate time arrives they may be in a position to assume and continue party work through the positions attained by them.

A discussion was held with various officers of the Federation on December 12, 1935, concerning this matter, at which time the above data were made available to the security index. They reassured themselves as in complete agreement with the Department's policy as set forth above. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you that we feel the conditions being followed by the Department's relative stability, and we take positive steps in writing to the Department these precedents for the classification in connection with the review of security index names by the Department.

S or - Mr.
Deputy Attorney General

S or - Assistant Attorney General
TO:       DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM:     SAC, LOS ANGELES
SUBJECT:  SECURITY INDEX SEMI-ANNUAL VERIFICATIONS

In compliance with Manual of Instructions, Vol. 3, Section 870, page 31A:

The Los Angeles Office currently has 4171 active Security Index cards. This office continues to verify information on one-sixth of the Security Index cards each month.

All Security Index cards of the Los Angeles Office have been verified or are now in process of being verified for the period of the past six months.
(P) SECURITY INDEX - INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS — In some of our Security Index cases there have been no reported activities in subversive groups over extended periods. Further, no indications of defection have been received in these cases and as a result the subjects have been retained in the Security Index.

In order to resolve the question of the continued adherence to subversive principles by these individuals, the following instructions are to be placed into effect immediately. All Security Index subjects who have not been identified with any subversive activities since January 1, 1949, must be interviewed unless there are compelling reasons dictating against an interview in individual cases. In the latter circumstances, each such case should be called to the specific attention of the Bureau, together with the facts rendering an interview undesirable or impossible. Bureau authority must be procured for these interviews in accordance with Section 67C, 6b (7) (d) of the Manual of Instructions.

It is not desired that a project be undertaken to determine the cases falling into the above category. Offices, having a relatively small number of Security Index subjects, should, however, proceed to review their Security Index cases as circumstances permit. Larger offices should review the Security Index cases as they are reopened for the required annual investigative report or when the cases are processed in connection with the semianual verification of residence and employment addresses. The New York Office should follow the latter procedure - i.e., review its Security Index cases to determine the identities of subjects falling into the above category in connection with periodic verifications.

All offices are instructed to advise the Bureau by July 1, 1955, that the cases in which no subversive activities have been reported since January 1, 1949, have been identified and appropriate communications directed to the Bureau concerning interviews with these subjects in line with the preceding instructions herein.
Office Memo

DATE: 1/7/55

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 64 cards were added to the Security Index and 15 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 49 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,552.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.
TO:       Director, FBI

FROM:  SAC, Pittsburgh

DATE: January 13, 1955

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - CCISAB TABLING

Re SAC Letter No. 54-70 (K) dated 12-14-54.

Subsequent to a review of the files of all Security Index subjects tabbed CCISAB, all FD-122's necessary to delete the CCISAB tabbing from the Security Index cards of subjects, in accordance with instructions set out in rellet, have been forwarded to the Bureau.
Mr., of the Department called me on January 5, 1955, to advise that the Internal Security Division had received the Bureau's letter of December 24, 1954, to the Attorney General, setting forth the criteria or standards which the Bureau uses in determining dangerousness or potential dangerousness of an individual in connection with possible inclusion in the Security Index. Mr. said that the Internal Security Division is studying these criteria. He said that the criteria as set forth in this memorandum to the Attorney General amount to too many criteria for the criteria being used by the Department and, therefore, Departmental representatives will probably want to get together with us to discuss these.

I asked Mr. whether there was any area of criteria. I asked Mr. whether there was any area of disagreement. He said none to his knowledge but Mr. and he would like to discuss the criteria for the Department's clarification. Mr. said the criteria which the Department has used are based on memoranda previously sent by the Bureau to the Department.

I told Mr. that we are ready at any time to come over and discuss the criteria and at such time as he is ready, we will do so.

You will recall that we followed the Department for years in order to pin the Department down as to the Security Index standards. Finally, by memorandum dated October 8, 1952, the Department approved the standards we were using and specifically referred to Bureau memorandum relating to the standards dated September 10, 1950, and July 27, 1950. The Department, in their communication failed to mention the Bureau memorandum of June 29, 1951, in which we discussed the standards used by the Bureau in which we discussed the standards used by the Bureau in considerable detail, including our over-all concepts of the Emergency Detention Program. This oversight was called to the Department's attention and by memorandum dated November 25, 1952, the Department approved the Bureau's concepts of the Emergency Detention Program and the Security Index standards as outlined in the Bureau memorandum of June 29, 1951.
In our memorandum to the Attorney General dated December 23, 1954, we set forth the Security Index criteria and standards used by the Bureau, the data being taken directly from Section 370 of the Manual of Instructions. The standards submitted to the Attorney General are a compilation of the data furnished to the Department in previous memoranda and there has been no change in the basic criteria.

I believe we should hold a conference with Departmental officials to discuss all phases of the standards we are using and to answer any questions they may raise.

ACTION: A conference will be held with Mr. and Departmental representatives at such time as they are ready.
EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

To: Director, FBI
From: SA
Field Office or Division: Butte

Date: January 6, 1945

SUGGESTION: That information presently typed on back of Security Index cards by the Field Office be typed instead on a separate card and securely attached to the Security Index card, i.e., stapled. When a new Security Index card is received for the same Subject, and no changes are necessary in the information going on the back of the card, the separate card can be removed from the old Security Index card and attached to the new Security Index card.

Its advantages are: The vast majority of SI changes are for employment and residence which are on the front of the card. The information on the back of the card which is added by the Field Office remains fairly constant. Above procedure will eliminate typing the same information over and over each time the subject changes residence and/or employment. Savings to the Bureau will be the amount of salary equal to the amount of time it takes a typist to retype the information on the back of an SI card where no change is made in that information. In this connection those charged with maintaining the SI cards are usually employees in the higher pay grade ($_____ annually). (Impossible for me to compute)

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:
It is believed that considerable savings on a Bureau-wide basis can be effected with the adoption of the above suggestion, consequently, favorable recommendation is made that it be adopted.
Date: 1/6/55
To: Director, FBI
From: SA

DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT: BUTTE

SUGGESTION: That information presently typed on back of Security Index cards by the Field Office be typed instead on a separate card and securely attached to the Security Index card, e.g. stapled. Then a new Security Index card is received for the same subject and no changes are necessary in the information going on the back of the card, the separate card can be removed from the old Security Index card and attached to the new Security Index card.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):

Advantages of suggestion: The vast majority of SI changes are for employment and residence which are on the front of the card. The information on the back of the card which is added by the Field Office remains fairly constant. Above procedure will eliminate typing the same information over and over each time the subject changes residence and/or employment. Savings to the Bureau will be the amount of salary equal to the amount of time it takes a typist to retype the information on the back of an SI card where no change is made in that information. In this connection those charged with maintaining the SI cards are usually employees in the higher pay grades.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of suggestor)

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS OF DIVISION HEAD:
It is believed that considerable savings on a bureau-wide basis can be effected with the adoption of the above suggestion, consequently, favorable recommendation is made that it be adopted.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: DIRECTOR, FPI (ATTACHED MAIL)  DATE: 3/31/55

FROM: F.T.C., SAN ANTONIO

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - COMAS INFLIG

Re: SAC Letter 50-70 (k) dated 12/14/54.

All cases of Security Index subjects typed for COMAS in this office have been reviewed. FD-322 has been submitted in each case. If approved by the Bureau, there will be no COMAS subjects in this office.
TO:   DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, ATLANTA
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

ATLANTA DIVISION

JANUARY 17, 1955

Re SAC Letter #47, dated 5-21-51.

The addresses and employment of all Security Index
subjects has been verified in accordance with existing
instructions, with the following exceptions:

Photographs are available on all Security Index subjects
of the Atlanta Division.
The following is a report of the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on December 10, 1954.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Week of</th>
<th>New Cards Added</th>
<th>Cards Cancelled</th>
<th>Net Increase</th>
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<td>December 11-17</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 18-24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 25-31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1-7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 8-14</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 243 cards were added and 59 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 184 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,597.

**ACTION:**

This is for your information.
Office Memorandum  •  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO  

FROM  

DATE: January 12, 1955

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

SYNOPSIS:

Each month we follow the field closely of the status of security work by analyzing the backlog of pending cases and delinquency in Espionage, Internal Security, Security Matter, and foreign intelligence cases in classifications, and . Status of these cases as of December 31, 1954, is set forth herein.

Pending active matters in the entire field in the security classifications remained virtually unchanged, increasing slightly from 22,179 to 23,182. Delinquent matters decreased from 6,526 to 6,297, with the resultant over-all statistical decrease from 29.8 per cent to 25.8 per cent. The delinquency in security cases in the New York Office decreased substantially from 1,577 to 1,492, reducing delinquency from 29.3 to 26.4 per cent. The number of pending active matters in the classification increased in the New York Office from 41,021 to 41,117 and the delinquent items in this classification decreased from 1,323 to 1,222 or statistical delinquency of 29.3 per cent. It is noted that the 26.4 per cent of delinquency in the security classifications of the New York Office is the lowest percentage of delinquency in these classifications since the Bureau has, on a regular basis, been following the field in this matter.

Letters are being sent to local offices either instructing them to reduce their backlog and delinquency, or in some cases commenting upon their progress in bringing the security cases to current status.

RECOMMENDATION:

The field will continue to be followed closely in this matter and you will be advised of the results of the review of the January, 1955 administrative reports.
DETAILS:

Since December, 1951, we have been following, on a monthly basis, the twelve field offices having a large proportion of our pending security work and since March, 1952, all offices. We have written letters to the twelve offices and to other offices where progress in reducing the backlog of work and delinquency has not been satisfactory.

The December, 1952, administrative reports from all offices reflect that the total pending active matters in the classifications 1 and 2 increased by only two items this month from 26,479 to 26,481. The delinquent items decreased from 6,316 to 6,297, which represents a statistical decrease of 0.2 per cent.

The following statistics reflect the status of pending work including both pending active and pending inactive matters and delinquency for all field divisions as of December 31, 1951, and the progress for the last four months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>12-31-51</th>
<th>03-31-52</th>
<th>10-31-54</th>
<th>11-30-54</th>
<th>12-31-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,021</td>
<td>26,455</td>
<td>26,405</td>
<td>26,947</td>
<td>26,690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 -
### TOTAL DELINQUENT MATTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>12-31-53</th>
<th>01-03-54</th>
<th>04-30-54</th>
<th>05-31-54</th>
<th>06-30-54</th>
<th>07-31-54</th>
<th>08-31-54</th>
<th>09-30-54</th>
<th>10-31-54</th>
<th>11-30-54</th>
<th>12-31-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>525</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22,513</td>
<td>5,758</td>
<td>5,550</td>
<td>6,018</td>
<td>5,690</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,719</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>671</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,762</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,720</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,413</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,233</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following statistics reflect the total of pending active matters, delinquency and percentage of delinquency of all offices since January 31, 1953.

### CLASSIFICATIONS AND ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pending</th>
<th>Delinquent</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-31-53</td>
<td>24,099</td>
<td>11,772</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-30-53</td>
<td>22,955</td>
<td>11,233</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-53</td>
<td>22,063</td>
<td>10,690</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-54</td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>9,120</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-54</td>
<td>21,740</td>
<td>9,720</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-54</td>
<td>20,970</td>
<td>9,550</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-54</td>
<td>20,150</td>
<td>9,411</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-54</td>
<td>19,493</td>
<td>8,495</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-54</td>
<td>19,284</td>
<td>7,571</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-53</td>
<td>19,141</td>
<td>6,955</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-53</td>
<td>19,652</td>
<td>6,749</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-53</td>
<td>19,947</td>
<td>6,749</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-54</td>
<td>20,580</td>
<td>7,007</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-30-54</td>
<td>21,468</td>
<td>6,617</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-54</td>
<td>21,848</td>
<td>6,757</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-54</td>
<td>21,758</td>
<td>7,622</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-54</td>
<td>21,862</td>
<td>7,687</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-54</td>
<td>22,278</td>
<td>7,163</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-54</td>
<td>22,977</td>
<td>7,030</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-54</td>
<td>23,367</td>
<td>6,720</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-54</td>
<td>23,011</td>
<td>6,413</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-54</td>
<td>22,459</td>
<td>6,316</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-31-54</td>
<td>23,179</td>
<td>6,916</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-54</td>
<td>23,421</td>
<td>6,697</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- S -
### Statistics for Twelve Offices

**Security Index Count and For**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Security Index Cards 12-15-54</th>
<th>Pending Active Matters 11-30-54</th>
<th>Active Matters 12-31-54</th>
<th>Delinquent 11-30-54</th>
<th>Delinquent 12-31-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>7,015</td>
<td>5,349</td>
<td>5,640</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td>2,222</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>2,336</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Haven</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Letters being sent to offices indicated. See page 8 herein.

The over-all statistics for the eleven offices other than the New York Office since August 31, 1952, are as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pending Active Matters</th>
<th>Delinquent Matters</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-31-52</td>
<td>12,611</td>
<td>7,589</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-52</td>
<td>11,367</td>
<td>5,732</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-52</td>
<td>11,436</td>
<td>5,837</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-52</td>
<td>10,943</td>
<td>4,966</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-52</td>
<td>10,780</td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-53</td>
<td>10,721</td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28-53</td>
<td>10,060</td>
<td>2,827</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-53</td>
<td>9,877</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-53</td>
<td>9,724</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-53</td>
<td>9,906</td>
<td>2,566</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-53</td>
<td>9,547</td>
<td>2,149</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-53</td>
<td>9,601</td>
<td>2,763</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-53</td>
<td>9,843</td>
<td>2,871</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-53</td>
<td>9,552</td>
<td>3,316</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-53</td>
<td>9,614</td>
<td>3,021</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-53</td>
<td>10,306</td>
<td>2,938</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-53</td>
<td>10,168</td>
<td>3,209</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-54</td>
<td>10,201</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28-54</td>
<td>9,960</td>
<td>3,679</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-54</td>
<td>9,859</td>
<td>3,568</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-54</td>
<td>10,317</td>
<td>3,864</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-54</td>
<td>10,048</td>
<td>3,488</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-31-54</td>
<td>10,669</td>
<td>3,476</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-54</td>
<td>10,537</td>
<td>3,423</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-54</td>
<td>11,083</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-54</td>
<td>11,052</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-54</td>
<td>11,922</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During 1953, the New York Office made a steady reduction in delinquent matters in the security classifications as well as a steady reduction in the case backlog. During November, 1953, the security delinquency dropped below 50 per cent for the first time in 1953 to 47 per cent. This was reduced even further in December to 43 per cent as compared with January, 1952, delinquency of 76 per cent. In January, 1954, the New York delinquency security classifications. In January, 1954, the New York delinquency stood at 53 per cent. It was reduced, however, in February, 1954, to 32 per cent and during the period March through September, 1954, averaged 38 per cent. In October, 1954, the New York security delinquency dropped 38 per cent.
to 20.9 per cent and on November 29, 1954, to 25.2 per cent, the figure in each successive instance representing the lowest percentage of delinquency in the security classifications which had existed in the New York Office since this matter has been followed on a regular basis by the Bureau.

The December, 1954, administrative report of New York reveals still further progress. Its security delinquency decreased during the past month from 25.2 per cent to 26.4 per cent, a new low for that office. Although pending active security cases increased somewhat in the New York Office from 2,613 for November, 1954, to 3,240 for December, 1954, delinquent items decreased from 1,577 as of November, 1954, to 1,422 as of December, 1954.

The New York Office has approximately 24 per cent of the pending active matters in the and classifications in the entire field. This office also has approximately 10 per cent of the number of delinquent items in all classifications throughout the field. The average delinquency in all other offices at the end of November, 1954, was approximately 29.7 per cent. The New York delinquency was 26.4 per cent as previously noted.

The bulk of the New York backlog and delinquency is in the classification. During December, 1954, the number of pending active matters in the classification in the New York Office increased from 4,021 to 4,117. The number of delinquent matters in this classification decreased from 1,323 to 1,258 with a statistical decrease from 32.8 per cent for November, 1954, to 29.4 per cent as of December 31, 1954.

Statistical Report on the Remaining Forty Offices

The remaining forty offices are listed according to the percentage of delinquency on December 31, 1954, in total matters in classifications and . These statistics reflect the progress during December, 1954. It should be noted that many of the smaller offices have no pending matters in classifications and and their entire pending backlog is in classification .
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Active Matters 11-30-54</th>
<th>Active Matters 12-31-54</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent 11-30-54</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent 12-31-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Albany</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Little Rock</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Milwaukee</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Dallas</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Baltimore</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Charlotte</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* El Paso</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Norfolk</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Indianapolis</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Knozville</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Oklahoma City</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Salt Lake City</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Buffalo</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Denver</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Washington Field</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Louisville</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Pittsburgh</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Savannah</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* St. Louis</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Atlanta</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Cincinnati</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Kansas City</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Miami</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Phoenix</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Houston</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Mobile</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* New Orleans</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Birmingham</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* San Diego</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* San Juan</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* San Antonio</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Anac.orage</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Memphis</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Richmond</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Portland</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Butte</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Honolulu</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Omaha</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Springfield</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Letters sent to offices indicated regarding delinquent status. See page 8 herein.
The following figures illustrate the progress of the forty offices as a whole since June 30, 1952, as reflected in the administrative reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pending (Active Matters)</th>
<th>Delinquent Matters</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-30-52</td>
<td>8,417</td>
<td>3,842</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-52</td>
<td>7,778</td>
<td>3,156</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-52</td>
<td>6,928</td>
<td>3,034</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-52</td>
<td>6,168</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-52</td>
<td>6,126</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-52</td>
<td>6,129</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-52</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-53</td>
<td>6,060</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28-53</td>
<td>6,103</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-53</td>
<td>5,985</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-53</td>
<td>5,892</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-53</td>
<td>4,899</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-53</td>
<td>5,618</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-31-53</td>
<td>5,146</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-31-53</td>
<td>5,035</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-30-53</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-53</td>
<td>4,887</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-30-53</td>
<td>4,180</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-53</td>
<td>3,257</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-54</td>
<td>5,562</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28-54</td>
<td>6,099</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-31-54</td>
<td>6,079</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-54</td>
<td>5,787</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-54</td>
<td>6,193</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-54</td>
<td>7,022</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-54</td>
<td>6,910</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-54</td>
<td>6,728</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-54</td>
<td>6,710</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-54</td>
<td>6,594</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-54</td>
<td>6,787</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-54</td>
<td>6,449</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Letters to the Field

As noted previously, on page one herein, we are sending letters to 18 offices either instructing them to take appropriate measures to bring the investigations in the security classifications to, or maintain them in a current status. Letters are being directed to the offices indicated by asterisks on pages four and seven herein. It will be noted that the security delinquency of those offices for the month of December, 1954, appears in the extreme right hand column of the two lists on pages four and seven.
(I) MISTAKEN IDENTITIES - SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -- Your attention is specifically directed to Section D, SAC Letter Number 121, Series 52, dated November 12, 1939. Therein it is pointed out the necessity of avoiding submission of reports containing erroneous identifications. I wish to repeat at this time the imperative obligation of all employees to be sure that all activity attributed to the subjects of investigations does, in fact, pertain to the individuals under investigation. Several instances have been noted recently wherein activities of individuals with names similar to those of subjects under investigation were incorrectly attributed to the persons under investigation. In each instance addresses were available for these persons and had appropriate background investigation been conducted the errors would have been avoided. Investigative conclusions must be based on facts rather than unsupported assumptions if we are to maintain our standards of investigative accuracy. At your next conference of security agents you should bring this matter forcefully to the attention of all Agent personnel.
Assistant Attorney General

January 19, 1955

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX LIST

There is attached hereto a current list of
the names of the individuals maintained in the Security
Index. Names included in the main portion of the list
are arranged alphabetically. The names of individuals
are contained within five designated groups and are listed on
separate pages. Following each name is information
reflected the race, sex, birth date, bureau file
number and the bureau field office covering the
residence of the individual.

It is requested that this list be given
utmost security.

Attachment (1)

Note on Various Groups:
Espionage Section of the Special
Group not included. The five
designated groups are:

Foreign Government Employees
United Nations Employees
Pro Tito Yugoslavia
U.S. Government Employees
Atomic Energy Program Employees
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

FROM

DATE: 1/21/55

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX—

During the past week 52 cards were added to the Security Index and 9 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 43 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,640.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.
The Security Index list as of January 14, 1955, has been prepared. One copy is attached herewith for transmittal to the SAC, Quantico, for retention in his personal custody with the other vital records maintained at the FBI Academy.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That this memorandum and attached list be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, marked Personal and Confidential, Registered, Return Receipt Requested.

2. That upon receipt, the SAC, Quantico, place the attached list with the other vital records maintained at Quantico, personally destroy by burning the old Security Index list in his possession and note hereon that such action has been taken.

3. That thereafter, this memorandum be returned to the Bureau, marked for my attention.
January 26, 1955

PROPOSED CHANGE IN
SECTION 870
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

The sentence under (3) (A) on page 294 of Section 870 of the Manual of Instructions should be amended in its entirety to read:

(A) Any individual known to be currently engaged in espionage activities.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

FROM

DATE: 1/28/55

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 37 cards were added to the Security Index and 19 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 18 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,658.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.
Assistant Attorney General  

January 30, 1955

Director, FBI

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SEC
This change merely clarifies the point and
in no way affects notices already on the Security Index
by virtue of being effective since in every instance
by back date indicated the change in the Security
Index until the occurrence in current espionage
activity has been established by investigation.

You will be promptly advised of any
consideration given in the future to changing the
Security Index criteria.
In my memorandum to you dated 1/5/55, I advised that Mr. Mr. of the Department had contacted me in connection with the Bureau's letter of 12/23/54 to the Attorney General, setting forth the criteria or standards which the Bureau uses in determining dangerousness or potential dangerousness of an individual in connection with possible inclusion in the Security Index. At that time Mr. Mr. said that the Internal Security Division was studying these criteria and that there appeared to be an area of disagreement with the Department's criteria but that after further study he would like to discuss the criteria with Bureau representatives for the purpose of clarification.

I recommended that a conference be held with Mr. Mr. and Department representatives at such time as they were ready. The Director approved the recommendation and commented that it is not up to us to advise what his Division should do.

On 1/24/55, Supervisor and I met with Mr. Mr. of the Department's Internal Security Division. Mr. Mr. stated that they had carefully reviewed the Security Index criteria as listed in the Bureau's letter to the Attorney General dated 12/23/54, and that there was no area of disagreement between the Bureau's criteria and the criteria used by the Department. Mr. Mr. concurred.

I pointed out that the criteria as listed in the 12/23/54 letter to the Attorney General were taken directly from our manual of Instructions to field offices and were in sufficient detail to afford assistance to our field personnel in evaluating cases and recommending cases for the Security Index. Mr. Mr. stated he intended to recommend that the Department adopt a criteria exactly as set out in the referenced letter and requested to be advised at any time amendments or changes to the criteria are being considered. I told him that we would see that the Department is so advised.
Mr. suggested that we might wish to consider rewording item A in the criteria for the purpose of clarification. I read: "Any subject of a current espionage investigation." I told him we would be glad to consider the point. I explained to him that in every instance of that type names have not been entered in the Security Index until engagement in current espionage activity has been established by investigation.

Both Mr. and Mr. understand that there are varying degrees of revolutionary dispositions and subversive activities and that the Security Index criteria or standards are not all-inclusive but are used as guides to assist in determining whether there are reasonable grounds for inclusion in investigation for considering a person dangerous or potentially dangerous.

It is recommended that item A in the criteria be changed to read as follows: "Any individual known to be currently engaged in espionage activities." This merely clarifies the point and in no way affects existing Security Index cards.

**ACTION:**

If you approve there is attached a letter to Mr. and a Manual change. An SAC Letter is not necessary on this change since there is no change in policy.
The Office Index has cards for 22,227 persons as of January 14, 1955. This is a net increase of 229 or 1.0% over last month, of the total, 25,590 or 93.1% are communists.

A detailed table is attached in duplicate. The table shows as of January 14, 1955, the distribution of the subjects by field office, antagonistic tendencies, dangerousness, sex, race, and citizenship. Also the number on "special lists" are shown. A key to abbreviations is attached.
### Key to Abbreviations Used in Security Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Alien</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Consab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Detcon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEF</td>
<td>Key Figure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Naturalized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Native Born</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Top Functionary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEP</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Program Employees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUL</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Communist Party, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSSF</td>
<td>Espionage Subjects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGE</td>
<td>Foreign Government Employees</td>
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<tr>
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<td>United States Government Employees</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISL</td>
<td>Independent Socialist League</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFG</td>
<td>Johnson Forest Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCI</td>
<td>Muslim Cult of Islam</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Proletarian Party of America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUA</td>
<td>Socialist Union of America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Socialist Workers' Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNE</td>
<td>United Nations Employees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR</td>
<td>Union of the People for the Establishment of the Republic of Puerto Rico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUG</td>
<td>Yugoslavian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Office Memorandum

TO: 
FROM: SECURITY 
SUBJECT: File

DATE: January 31, 1955

Pursuant to the recommendations contained in the memorandum from the Executives' Conference to the Director dated January 25, 1955, captioned "Security Index," a proposed SAC Letter and appropriate Manual changes have been prepared. The Executives' Conference memorandum is attached.

ACTION:

The proposed SAC Letter and Manual changes are attached for approval.

For the information of the Training and Inspection Division, the SAC Letter should be prepared and sent to the field immediately due to the urgency of this matter.
Page 26 b - Following the heading "(1) Purpose," under "B. Security Information," the third paragraph shall be revised to read as follows:

"The action shall be taken against any individuals involved in the security investigation in order to prevent unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information for other actions against such individuals by the Attorney General."

Page 29 - Insert the following as a separate paragraph immediately after the heading "(a) Determination of Dangerousness of an Individual:"

"The following is a list of factors which will be considered in determining whether an individual is dangerous:"

Page 29 b - Insert the following as a separate paragraph immediately after the heading "(b) Instructions for the preparation of security index cards:"

"The Senior Agent in Charge shall manually:"
Page 32 a - At top of page, immediately after capital "Conciliation and recall of cards from the active security list," insert the following as a separate paragraph:

"The Special Court in Charge shall personally inspect and summarily dispose of matters of the commission and inaction of W. J. Brown."
(A) SECURITY INDEX -- Due to the present grave and tense international situation I am deeply concerned over our Security Index Program which in time of national emergency represents the Nation's most powerful weapon in combating espionage, sabotage and insurrection by preventing dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals from remaining at liberty.

I want you to know that the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases but that in an emergency he will direct that all persons whose names are then included in the Security Index be promptly apprehended. Therefore, the Bureau for all intents and purposes is responsible for the listing of all names included in the Security Index and for the arrests which will follow at the time of an emergency. We must be certain at all times that the listing of every name in the Security Index is supported by sufficient information concerning subversive activities or revolutionary tendencies developed during thorough investigations to establish grounds for detention in the event of a national crisis.

The failure to have the names of all dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals in the Security Index at the time of an emergency means we have not fulfilled our responsibilities in the security field and we will not be in a position to prevent sabotage, espionage, sedition, insurrection and strikes or slowdowns directed by subversive elements. On the other hand it is essential that only dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals are listed for apprehension in an emergency.

In that connection I want to emphasize to you again the absolute necessity for bringing all pending security cases to a logical conclusion where investigation remains to be conducted before a determination can be made regarding inclusion in the Security Index.

In view of the importance of this matter I am holding each Special Agent in Charge personally responsible for each Security Index listing in his office to be certain that each listing is based on sound grounds.

The following instructions shall be placed into effect immediately:
1. Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally recommend the inclusion of each name for the Security Index and the removal of any name from the Security Index, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the recommendations must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

2. An immediate review of the case file on each individual whose name is presently included in the Security Index shall be made at this time. Although the recommendations for inclusion of names that are in the Security Index at this time have emanated from your office in most instances and under present requirements, these cases are reviewed in connection with the preparation of annual supplemental investigative reports. During which reviews you have been specifically instructed to evaluate each case to be certain the Security Index card is warranted, I am initiating this comprehensive review at this time to make absolutely certain that all factors in every case have been thoroughly considered by you to determine if the cases remain sound.

Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally approve or disapprove the retention of the names of all subjects in the Security Index at this time, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the approvals or disapprovals must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor. The approval or disapproval shall be submitted to the Bureau. The approval or disapproval for each Security Index case, each in an individual memorandum for each case, shall be submitted under the title of the individual case memorandum shall set forth and shall reference this SAC Letter. Each memorandum must clearly reflect the soundness of your decision.

The reviews must be completed within 30 days from the receipt of this communication by all offices having less than 1,000 Security Index cases. All the remaining offices must complete the reviews within 90 days from the receipt of this letter with the exception of the New York Office where the reviews must be completed within 6 months.

For your information the following offices have more than 1,000 names on the Security Index at this time: Chicago, Detroit, etc.

2/2/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-8
Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco. In connection with the above instructions both as to adding names to or deleting names from the Security Index and the review of all Security Index cases the Bureau is making the exception in offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects because of the volume of work in those offices. The Bureau instructs that the reviews and recommendations in these matters in such offices be shared proportionately by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge and Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

Each Special Agent in Charge must keep an accurate record of the progress of the reviews. An airtel must be submitted to the Bureau each Friday after the receipt of this communication until the project is completed setting forth: (1) the total number of cases to be reviewed during this project and (2) the number of cases in which the required data has been forwarded to the Bureau. Each airtel is to be captioned "Security Index Review."
Memorandum  •  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: 2/4/55

During the past week 56 cards were added to the Security Index and 9 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 47 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,705.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, PORTLAND

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX; COMSAB TABBING

DATE: 2-7-55

Be SAC letter 54-70 dated 12/14/54, paragraph (X) captioned "SECURITY INDEX - COMSAB TABBING".

In consonance with Bureau instructions, the files of all Security Index subjects tabbed Comsab have been personally reviewed by me and the appropriate adjustments have been made.

As of possible interest, on receipt of referenced SAC letter, this office had a total of 67 Security Index subjects tabbed for Comsab. Upon the completion of the review, we now have 23 Security Index subjects tabbed Comsab; or, a reduction of 44 such tabbings. Work list is being retained in instant file with copy of this letter.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: Feb. 2, 1955

TO

FROM

SUBJECT: "SECURITY INDEX -

In accordance with the Director's instructions there is attached an air-tel to all offices instructing that the residence and business addresses of all Detcon and Constab subjects in the Security Index be immediately verified with the exception of those that have been checked out within the past 30 days. (The Detcon and Constab classification include all Security Index subjects who are considered exceedingly dangerous who should be apprehended prior to others in the Security Index.) Total as of 1-31-55: 10,020.

All offices will advise the Bureau by air-tel February 11, 1955, that the checks have been made. Any office which is unable to complete the work by February 11, 1955, will advise by air-tel the number they have been able to verify and the number remaining to be checked out.

The offices will also list the names of those Detcon and Constab subjects who cannot be located together with the date the last known address was verified.

The original of the above air-tel is on Plastiplate and is being retained in Room 1003. It may be procured for initializing by calling Mr. on extension 2355.
TO: ALL CAG's

SUBJECT: The above order to be assured that the
CURRENT ADDRESSES OF ALL SECURITY CHARGES SUBJECT TO
REVIEW OR ACTION ARE KNOWN. Therefore, you should
IMMEDIATELY CHECK CURRENT RESIDENCE AND ADDRESSES ADDRESSES
OF ALL SUCH SUBJECTS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED WITHIN
60 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION. THIS PROJECT
SHOULD BE COMPLETED, AT TIMES, BY JANUARY 12, 1969.

On the last all officers which have completed the check
MUST SUBMIT AN APPEND OR ADVISORY AND LISTING THE NAME
OF EACH SUBJECT AND DATE IT IS TO BE COMPLETED WITH THE
DATE THE LAST CHECK ADDRESS WAS VERIFIED. ANY OFFICES
WHICH ARE HAVING TO COMPLETE THIS CHECK BY FEBRUARY 12,
1969, MUST ADVISE THE CAG's so THAT DATE THE SUBJECTS
REVIEW IN CAG's CHESS AND DUTIES OR REASON FOR NOT COMPLETING
THE NUMBER REMAINING TO BE CHECKED, THIS INSTRUCTION IS
GIVEN FOR YOUR ATTENTION AND THIS ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS MUST
BE ADHERED TO STRICTLY. CONTINUOUS INVESTIGATIVE ATTENTION
UNDER YOUR PERSONAL DIRECTION MUST BE GIVEN TO THOSE PEOPLE
OR SUBJECTS WhOS ADDRESSES CHANGED OR VERIFIED
DURING THIS CHECK.
TO: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEBRUARY 9, 1955
RADIOGRAM

Transmit the following message to SAC, SAN DIEGO
ATTENTION: INSPECTOR

SECURITY INDEX, as telephone call from Inspector

TO BUREAU FEBRUARY EIGHT LAST. INSPECTOR'S WRITE-UPS WITH
SAC's COMMENTS REGARDING APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF SECURITY
INDEX CARDS IS SATISFACTORY IN COMPLIANCE WITH SAC LETTER
NUMBER FIFTY FIVE EIGHT EIGHT PROVIDING SAC HAS PERSONALLY
REVIEWED EACH CASE FILE AND REASONS FOR RETAINING IN OR
REMOVING FROM SECURITY INDEX ARE SET OUT IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL.

TO CLEARLY REFLECT THE SOUNDERNESS OF DECISION, EACH
RECOMMENDATION SHOULD BE PURSUED IN INDIVIDUAL CASE BY
COVER MEMORANDUM RE SAC RECOMMENDING CANCELLATION OF
EXISTING SECURITY INDEX CARD. SITUATION SHOULD BE HANDLED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS THAT PRIOR TO
CANCELLATION THE SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR INTERVIEW.
UNLESS REASONS AS PURSUED BUREAU SAY INTERVIEW IS INADVISABLE
OR IMPOSSIBLE. NO INTERVIEW SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT
PRIOR BUREAU AUTHORITY.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: 

FROM: 

DATE: February 10, 1955

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF SECURITY INDEX

SAC spoke to me on February 9 regarding the review being made of the Security Index cases in the field. He advised that there are some problem cases and he wondered whether the Bureau was in any way changing its standards for persons to be included in the Index.

I advised him that the standards have not been changed as of this time, that the Bureau recognizes there are some borderline cases and we are going over some of them to see whether any changes should be made. However, at this time there is no change and the review desired is exactly in accordance with the SAC Letter which calls for the review. I told him that the Bureau is considering, and will probably adopt, a change in our DETCOM procedures whereby those persons tabbed for prior apprehension will be restricted to individuals on whom a strong case can be made showing immediate potential danger of espionage, sabotage, or disruption in the event of an emergency.

I told him that instructions would be coming out to the field on this I thought within a few days and that his review of the cases should take this into account.
By reference from Mr. , office I talked with Inspector at San Diego on February 1, 1955, regarding certain Security Index cases. The Inspector advised me that in connection with the removal of names presently in the Security Index, the Inspector was reviewing all Security Index cases and preparing individual write-ups for each case listing into the sufficiency of the Security Index listing.

Inspector stated that the SAC will be notified to comment in each case regarding the Inspector's recommendations in the matter. He inquired as to whether a copy of the Inspector's write-up and the SAC's comments submitted to the bureau by cover memorandum in each case would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements set out in SAC Letter Number 33-5, dated February 2, 1955. That SAC letter required a memorandum from the SAC for each Security Index case advising whether the SAC approved or disapproved the Security Index listing.

Inspector stated that in certain cases he was recommending reinterviews or interviews be conducted prior to a final decision concerning retention or cancellation of Security Index cards.

Inspector inquired as to the procedure to be followed in connection with the review of all Security Index cases as outlined in SAC Letter Number 33-5 which in part stated that each SAC shall personally approve or disapprove the retention of names presently in the Security Index. He inquired as to whether the SAC should request Bureau authority to interview a Security Index subject prior to recommending the removal from the Security Index as is required under existing instructions in Section 9 of the Manual of Instructions or whether the removal should be recommended without a request to interview.

Inspector requested to be advised concerning the questions raised by radiogram.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) It is recommended that Inspector be advised that the Inspector's criteria in each Security Index case along with the SAC's comments will be sufficient to answer the requirements as set out in L. & Letter Number 55-8 providing the SAC has personally reviewed the individual case files and each write-up sets forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of the decision.

(2) It is recommended that Inspector be advised that prior to recommending the cancellation of an existing Security Index card the SAC should consider requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject or furnish a satisfactory reason to the Bureau reflecting that such an interview is inadvisable or impossible in accordance with existing instructions in Section 87c of the Manual of Instructions.

(3) If you approve, there is attached a radiogram to the SAC at San Diego, marked for the attention of Inspector advising him in accordance with the above recommendations.
TO: THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - General

The Executives' Conference on February 5, 1955, consisting of Messrs., considered problems affecting the Security Index including the concept of dividing the Index into two categories; the first group tabooed for priority apprehensions in the event of a limited but grave emergency and the second group to be arrested in the event of an all-out emergency.

BACKGROUND:

As of February 5, 1955, we had listed on the Security Index for detention, in the event the Attorney General's Emergency Detention Program goes into effect, a total of 36,705 individuals. Of these, 10,682 (as of January 14, 1955) were listed for priority apprehension based on leadership in subversive organizations such as the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, et cetera; past training in espionage or sabotage; information reflecting past or current activities indicating that the individual may be violent; or persons on the Security Index employed in or having access to key facilities.

The extent and type of activities of the individuals on the Security Index varies and consequently the potential dangerousness of these individuals varies accordingly. In the event of a limited but grave emergency, such as war with Soviet Russia wherein the fighting took place outside the continental limits of the United States, it is suggested that apprehensions under the Emergency Detention Program be limited to those persons having a strong potential for espionage, sabotage, or disruptive activities, leaving the remainder of the Security Index for apprehension in the event the emergency assumes such proportions that the security of the nation demands extension of the arrests to all persons potentially dangerous to the country. This latter situation will exist in the event of imminent invasion or attack on the continental United States itself.
In order to implement this concept of the Detention Program it will be necessary to change our priority classification in the Security Index to include only those individuals who would clearly constitute an immediate and strong danger to the country as potential saboteurs, espionage agents, and disruptionists. This group would be confined to the following, all of whom could be shown to be engaged in strong subversive activities, current or during the recent past:

1) All top functionaries and key figures (These are the leaders of subversive organizations who implement and carry out the policy of the organizations.)

2) Currently active Communists (active during the good year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or none of the following:

(a) local organizers or leaders;
(b) special training at the Lenin School or For Eastern Institute in Moscow; (These were special Marxist-Leninist schools held in Russia for picked individuals.)
(c) experience as picket captains, strong-arm men, or active participation in violent strikes, riots, or demonstrations;
(d) persons who have made violent statements or who are known to have strong revolutionary tendencies as evidenced by their activities.

3) Persons active in the Communist Party underground;

4) Any other individual whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary group, clearly and unmistakably depict that he is a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency.

In each of the above categories the individual case will stand on its own merits. It is estimated that this group tabbed for priority apprehension will be less than 5000.
MEMORANDUM FOR

The remainder of the individuals on the Security Index will be listed for apprehension in the event of an all-out emergency wherein the country is faced with the necessity of taking precipitate security measures. Each of these individuals will, nevertheless, present a potential danger to the security of this country and there will be a calculated risk in holding up his apprehension at the time of an emergency which would require the apprehension of the priority group. There are, however, certain definite advantages to this procedure, such as:

1) The Bureau would concentrate immediately on those individuals labelled most dangerous during the first few days of an emergency.

2) In the event the war or emergency did not develop to the point of actual invasion or devastation of the United States itself, the normal police controls may be sufficient to control the activity of the remaining individuals on the Security Index. It is a fundamental principle that the liberties of citizens should not be infringed upon unless absolutely necessary and that, unless arrests are absolutely necessary of all persons on the index, this procedure should be avoided. The Bureau would be showing its continued observance of respecting the rights of individual citizens to the greatest extent possible consistent with the security of the nation and would thus avoid criticism for stern restrictions subject to criticism at a later date.

3) It is felt that under this procedure the Bureau would be in a position to answer possible criticism in the future by pointing out that it sought to avoid apprehensions of the full Security Index until the overriding considerations of security based on the all-out emergency demanded that this be done.

We should take cognizance of certain disadvantages to this procedure:

1) As all persons on the Security Index are considered potentially dangerous, there is a risk that these individuals not arrested, if arrests are restricted to a priority group, will commit acts of sabotage, espionage, et cetera, detrimental to the security of the country.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR.

2) If the apprehensions are restricted to a priority group, the remaining subjects are very likely to flee or go into hiding, making their ultimate arrest, if necessary, most difficult.

3) The subjects who will be tabbed for priority apprehension are, to a large extent, subjects who will be most difficult to locate in the event of an emergency. Many of them are in the underground now or at least have experience in underground activities. Therefore, our percentage of apprehensions in this group will logically be smaller than it would be in the over-all group.

If this breakdown for priority apprehension is put into effect, the field should be advised immediately in order that the field may include in its current review of Security Index subjects a recommendation as to those persons who should be included for priority apprehension.

Executives’ Conference Recommendation (Concluded):

The Executives’ Conference unanimously recommended that the above procedure be put into effect at once; that is, the Security Index be split into two groups; one designated for apprehension in a limited but grave emergency short of actual invasion or imminent attack on the continental United States, and the other listed for apprehension in the event of all-out emergency which would require this country to put into effect the most stringent security measures for self-preservation purposes.

If you agree, an EAC Letter implementing this is attached.

Mr. Reads: This memorandum should be placed on the file and signed as you see fit.

P. Underlining.
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: THE DIRECTOR
FROM: THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

DATE: January 25, 1955

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

On January 25, 1955, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Members, considered certain problems raised by Mr. in connection with the Security Index.

(1) The Manual of Instructions, Volume III, Section 87C, page 268, where the purpose of the Security Index is set forth, states in part "in preparing and maintaining the Security Index, the Bureau is acting only in the capacity of assembling the facts concerning the individuals involved for referral to the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice for their consideration and decision as to action to be taken at a time of national emergency."

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Continued):

That inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised the Bureau that he does not have the funds or manpower to review cases on the Security Index, to all practical effects, the decision rests with the FBI as to who will be apprehended in an emergency. Therefore, the above phraseology should be changed to read as follows: "However, in preparing and maintaining the Security Index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised the Bureau that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases."

(2) Section 87C (s) lists a number of factors which should be considered in assisting in a determination as to an individual's potential dangerousness. Among these factors Mr. felt that the following were very weak: subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization; contributions to or collection of funds for the organization; and refusal to furnish information or to testify regarding membership or activities in a subversive movement.

In the instructions following the listing of these and other factors, the Manual states "It is not intended
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

"that an individual shall be deemed dangerous merely because
one or more of the foregoing factors are applicable in his case.
However, these factors should be considered as indicating
loyalty to a subversive organization, thereby assisting in
determination of the dangerousness or potential dangerousness
of an individual subject and whether he should be included in
the Security Index under the standards set forth below."
Thereafter the standards utilized by the Bureau for considera-
tion for inclusion in the Security Index set forth in detail.
Mr. Salton felt that the Manual should more clearly state that
the factors listed in Section 87C (2), and particularly the
three factors set forth above, do not of themselves constitute
a basis for inclusion in the Security Index.

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

That following the title under Section 87C (2),
"Determination of Dangerousness of an Individual," the
following be set forth in order that these factors will not be
confused with the standards under which to place persons on
the Security Index: "The following is a list of factors which
will be of assistance in determining the dangerousness of an
individual. However, they are not to be considered as standards
for placing or on the Security Index, as such standards are listed
in Section 87C (3)."

At the present time although by SAC Letters the field
has been instructed that the SAC is responsible for proper
investigation and evaluation of Security Index cases, there is
no specific requirement that the SAC shall personally review
and approve the recommendation that a person be included in
the Security Index. Further, while there is a requirement
that cases be brought up to date, analyzed and evaluated, at
least annually, by the administration of an "SAC report" (except
in the case of the SAC field office), there is no specific
requirement for a renewed recommendation from the field at
any time for the continuation of the subject on the Security Index.

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

That an SAC Letter be sent to the field, cautioning
the field as to the seriousness of inclusions of names of
persons on the Security Index and pointing out that the Bureau
is, in effect, making the decisions for arrests, since the
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Department of Justice has now and apparently will not approve for attorneys to review and approve such inclusion. Also, that this SAC Letter make it the personal responsibility of the SAC to make recommendations to include or cancel subjects for the Security Index, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instance the recommendations must be made by the SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor. (This would include Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco.)

This SAC Letter will further require that an immediate review be made by the field of all cases in the Security Index at this time and that the SACs (except as indicated in the above six offices) personally approve or disapprove the retention of the present subjects in the Security Index, this approval or disapproval to be set forth in individual memoranda on each case to the Bureau setting forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index.

The Executives' Conference recommended that this review be completed within sixty days by all offices having less than 1,000 cases; all the remaining offices within 90 days, with the exception of New York which will have a deadline of six months.

If you agree with the above, an appropriate SAC Letter will be prepared.

(4) Relative to approval of cases for inclusion in the Security Index, the present system is that the individual Supervisor handling the substantive case reviews the file and either approves or disapproves recommendations from the field as to inclusion of a subject in the Security Index. The recommendations of the individual Supervisors then flow through one experienced Supervisor who likewise reviews the file and makes his recommendation. If there is any disagreement at this point, or if there is not a clear showing as to the action to be taken, the case is referred to Section Chief Baumgardner, and if necessary to Assistant Director Belmont for a decision.

Executives' Conference Recommendation: (Unanimous)

The Executives' Conference unanimously felt that an additional step is desirable at this time to insure that
the placing of individuals on the Security Index is approved
at a high level. Therefore, the Conference recommended that
in the future the review and approval of the inclusion of the
names of individuals be performed initially by supervisor
the Supervisor in Charge of this work:
the Chief of the Internal Security Section or Inspecror
who is in charge of the Internal Security-Liaison Branch
of the Domestic Intelligence Division. In cases of disagreement
the case will come to Assistant Director
noted that this will throw an additional burden on representa-
tives of the Division already handling a very heavy assignment.
However, it will be worked out.

The Conference further noted that as the results of
the field review of the current Security Index subjects are
received at the State of Government, the cases will be reviewed
by the Domestic Intelligence Division.

(5) Mr. further recommended that a group of five
specially qualified agents be brought in from the field for
the purpose of instituting an independent and continuing review
of the Security Index and to act in the role of "devil's advocate"
in making such a review. The remainder of the Conference
recommended that this not be done, as it was felt that the steps
outlined above were a more desirable approach to the problem.

If you agree, we will be guided by the recommendation
of the majority in this instance.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

1. Agree with

2. What concerns me is this

did say some thing
defects in the procedure of those submitting
inflated concern about the project

recently nothing
maybe a re-examination of F2

(2) with a communication from the field.
I have studied the current instructions to the field relative to the Security Index and the criteria to be used in placing the names of persons on this index. The Bureau obviously is responsible for more than assembling facts for referral to the Department of Justice for its decision with respect to the persons listed on this index, since the situation now is that the FBI, from all practical standpoints, is taking the decision that the person whose name is placed on the index will be taken into custody in the event of hostilities and the FBI will be held responsible for any improper arrests which cannot be justified before the administrative or judicial boards which will consider the cases of those persons taken into custody.

It is obvious to us that we must proceed with strict policy with respect to placing the names of persons on this index. The manual provisions in this respect are somewhat misleading. They state, for example, "In preparing and maintaining the security index, the Bureau is acting only in the capacity of assembling the facts concerning the individuals involved for referral to the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice for their consideration and decision as to action to be taken at a time of national emergency."

It seems to me that we in the Bureau must conform to the basic premise that any person to be placed on the index is considered as potentially dangerous to the national security of the United States in the event of a national emergency and that the FBI is in possession of facts dangerous to the internal security of the United States in the event of a national emergency and that the FBI is in possession of facts dangerous to the national security of the United States in the event of a national emergency. This is certain to be in literally thousands of cases.

Some of the factors to be considered in determining the dangerousness of the individual, as covered in the manual, seem to me to be very weak, such as Section 27C (2-L) Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization; (2-I) Contributions to or collections of funds for the organization, and (2-Q) Refusal to furnish information or to testify regarding membership or activities in a subversive movement.

The manual, with respect to the handling of these cases in the field, merely states that the Agent handling the case in the
office of origin should submit a form recommendation (Form FD-102.)

There is no specific requirement that the Special Agent in Charge shall personally review and approve such recommendations. It is the responsibility of the individual to assure that his case is properly investigated and evaluated.

I would like to recommend an SAC Letter outlining the field to the seriousness of inclusion of names of persons on this list and pointing out that we are in effect making the decisions for arrests since the Department of Justice has not and apparently will not arrange for attorneys to review and approve such inclusions.

I recommend that it be a part of the personal responsibility of the SAC to make such recommendations and that we hold them responsible for such actions, except as to New York as indicated below.

At the desk of Commissioners it is advised that at present the approval of placing a name on the index is made by an individual supervisor, one of many who handle this type of work. The recommendations and approval of this individual supervisor is reviewed, discussed, and approved by the chief internal security supervisor in the Internal Security Section, whose recommendations are then referred to the SAC for approval. The SAC, in turn, is referred to the Office of the Section Chief of the Internal Security Section, Director, for a decision. The decision is then referred to the Office of the Section Chief for decision.

At the desk of Government it is my recommendation that in the future the review and approval of the inclusion of the names of individuals be personally handled by the Section Chief of the Internal Security Section, or Inspector, who is in overall charge of the Internal Security - Liaison Branch of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

In the field both active and inactive subjects on this list are checked each 6 months as to their whereabouts. With respect to inactive subjects, there is a requirement that the case be brought up to date, analyzed and evaluated annually by the submission of a field report. However, there is no specific requirement for a renewed recommendation from the field at any time for the continuance of the person on the index.

I would like to recommend an annual consideration by the field on both active and inactive subjects as to whether the person should be continued on the index and that this, in line with the above recommendation, be the personal responsibility of the Special Agent in Charge.

I am advised that in New York City there are approximately 2100 security index subjects. It is not required that the New York Office reopen their inactive cases for the purpose of bringing them up to date annually as is required of other offices. A moratorium was declared for New York in this connection because of personnel limitations. New York does have a program of reactivating the cases which are observed to be the oldest at the time they make their 6 months check on whereabouts.

In New York City, in view of the volume of work, it would be my recommendation that the responsibility for reviewing recommended inclusions on the security index be that of the Special Agent in Charge, an Assistant Special Agent in Charge, or a qualified security supervisor.

If the foregoing recommendations are approved, within a comparatively short period of time we would be able to effect a review of all security index subjects in the light of our current responsibilities, as pointed out above.

Subject to your approval, I will discuss the above recommendations with the Executive Conference to see whether there are any reasons why they should not be placed into effect.
In the context of international relations, it is essential to have a comprehensive understanding of the geopolitical landscape and its implications. This requires a nuanced approach to the interpretation of events, ensuring that all aspects are considered before making any conclusions.

Focusing on bilateral relations and multi-lateral cooperation, it is crucial to ensure that all parties involved are treated fairly and justly. This involves not only maintaining strong diplomatic ties but also engaging in constructive dialogue to address any concerns or issues that may arise.

In light of these considerations, it is important to proceed with caution and careful thought when dealing with any situations that may impact international relations. This includes ensuring that all actions are transparent and consistent with the principles of good governance.

With respect to non-Chinese entities, it is vital to maintain open and constructive dialogue to foster mutual understanding and cooperation. This approach will help in building trust and bridging any divides that may exist.

In conclusion, the promotion of peace and stability in the international community requires a proactive and collaborative strategy. This involves not only the maintenance of strong diplomatic relationships but also the commitment to engage in meaningful dialogue to address any concerns or issues that may arise.

To this end, it is essential to ensure that all actions are transparent and consistent with the principles of good governance, fostering a positive environment for international cooperation and mutual understanding.
by including statement on recommendation form under Miscellaneous
"Subject sympathetic to Communist China," as additive to any other
notations under this heading. With respect to cases already on
Security Index where evidence is developed of previous Chinese
sympathies, filing will be required to direct separate letter to
Bureau pointing out this development and recommending consideration
requirement will enable
Bureau to keep close check on these lists and make additions
and deletions when necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Attached is proposed FG letter to field (a) explaining
purpose of program to them, (b) instructing where subject of
recommended Security Index card is of Chinese racial extraction to
indicate on form under Race, "Other - Chinese," (c) instructing
that all communications recommending cancellation of Security Index
cards on persons of Chinese racial extraction must specifically
mention the Chinese racial extraction above, (d) instructing that
Chinese racial extractions under "Miscellaneous," and (e) instructing further that an
existing cases on non-Chinese on Security Index where investigation
reveals Chinese sympathies warranting consideration under this
program separate letter must be directed to Bureau pointing this
out and recommending consideration under program.

2. It is recommended the Statistical Section make
arrangements to record on the IBM equipment the connotation Race
"Other - Chinese" on all future approved FD-122 forms. Attached
is a list of all persons on Security Index now of Chinese racial
extractions which should be so recorded. The recording of the list
attached and all future "Other - Chinese" should enable us to run
off and needed complete list of persons on Security Index of
Chinese racial extraction.
February 10, 1955  WASHINGTON, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX. -- In view of recent developments in the international situation it has become necessary to re-evaluate the priority of certain subjects of our Security Index System. At this present time subjects who will be considered for priority of arrest in the event of an emergency are those Detcom and the Detcom classification includes subjects who are tabbed Comsat.

Henceforth, it is planned that the individuals in the Security Index tabbed Detcom will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. It is not anticipated at this time that the other subjects in the Security Index will be arrested under such a situation. (In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.)

In order that the most dangerous persons will be apprehended during a limited but grave emergency, there are set forth below the new standards to be used in deciding who should be listed for priority of apprehension and Detcom tabbing:

1. The Comsat tabbing is to be discontinued.

2. Each Security Index subject should be considered for Detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of the following categories:

a. All Top Functionaries and Key Figures.

b. Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:

   (1) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization.

   (2) Special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.

   (3) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men or active participation in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.

   (4) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities.
c. Persons active in the Communist Party underground.

d. Any other Security Index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent or disruptionist in the event of an emergency.

Subjects who will be tabbed Detcom should comprise a hardcore of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own and the decision to consider a subject for priority of apprehension should be based on the subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies. Employment in a key orelite capacity will no longer be a reason alone for Detcom tabbing.

In evaluating each Security Index case it will be necessary to review each case file. This should be done in conjunction with the review of all Security Index cases in accordance with the instructions in SAC Letter Number 55-12 dated February 2, 1955. In submitting your personal recommendation for retaining a subject in the Security Index you should also submit your recommendation regarding the Detcom tabbing as indicated above along with your reasons why the subject meets the new Detcom standards in sufficient detail to justify your recommendation. If a subject is tabbed Detcom and Comsab at this time and you are not recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions you should submit a Form FD-122 attached to your Security Index recommendation in order to delete the Detcom and Comsab tabbings. If you are recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions and the subject is already tabbed Detcom, you should advise the Bureau and Form FD-122 need not be submitted. In instances in which you are recommending the Detcom tabbing and the subject is already tabbed Detcom and Comsab you should attach a Form FD-122 in order that the Comsab tabbing can be deleted. Of course, if the subject is not already tabbed Detcom and you are recommending such tabbing under the new instructions, you should attach a Form FD-122 to your Security Index recommendation in order that the Detcom tabbing can be added to the Security Index card.

There will be instances in which you have already submitted your recommendations that a Security Index subject should be retained in the Security Index. In those instances it will be necessary for you to recheck the individual case files to determine whether a Detcom tabbing is necessary and to advise the Bureau in accordance.

2/10/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12
with the above instructions.

In order that the Security Index cards for the subjects who are to be tabbed Detcon for priority of apprehension, as indicated above, will be readily available for emergency action in your office you should be guided by the following instructions regarding the arrangement of your Security Index.

1. Each Security Index case should be considered for Detcon tabbing whether the subject's Security Index card is filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of your Security Index. However, there is no change being made in the instructions regarding the Security Index cards which are to be filed in those three sections.

2. The Geographical Section of your Security Index should be divided into two distinct parts. Part I of the Geographical Section shall include when the Security Index cards for subjects who are tabbed Detcon under the new instructions set out above. Part II of the Geographical Section will contain the Security Index cards for all subjects that are not tabbed Detcon.

3. In offices having a Geographical breakdown by residence and by employment it will be necessary to have two breakdowns for each of these categories in order that the cards tabbed Detcon will be separated and maintained apart from the cards not so tabbed.

4. You should continue to file one Security Index card for each subject in the alphabetical Section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever. To assist you in readily identifying Security Index cards in the Alphabetical Section that will be tabbed Detcon under the new instructions a colored metal tab shall be fastened to each such card.

For your information, in the future as Detcon tabblings are approved the Security Index cards forwarded to you will not only carry the code letters DC in the first line on the cards but each such card will be stumped Detcon in large red letters. This procedure will assist you in being absolutely certain that cards tabbed Detcon are properly filed.

2/10/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12 - 3 -
The Detcom tabbing of a Security Index subject should be afforded your personal consideration and you should submit your personal recommendations for such tabbing during this review and in the future. In handling this matter in connection with your review of all Security Index cases you should meet the deadlines as set forth in SAC Letter 55-3 dated February 2, 1955. Security Index cards presently tabbed Detcom should not be placed in the new Detcom portion of the Geographical Section of your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations. There should be no changes made regarding the present Detcom tablings in your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations under the Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations under the Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations under the new procedure. In this manner the entire Security Index will be reviewed and reconsideration given to Detcom tablings by the periods indicated in SAC Letter Number 55-6.

In view of the new and separate breakdown in the Geographical Section of your Security Index for Detcom subjects it will no longer be necessary to place a separate tab on such cards as you have done in the past.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

2/10/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12
The Executives' Conference on February 8, 1955, consisting of Messrs. [name], considered, the mechanics to be used by Mr., Supervisor in charge of the Security Index Unit; Mr., Chief of the Internal Security Section; or Inspector in charge of the Internal Security Division Branch of the Executive Intelligence Division, in reviewing for approval, the names of individuals for inclusion in our Security Index.

BACKGROUND:

On January 25, 1955, the Executives' Conference recommended and the Director approved that Messrs. [name] would have to personally supervise the inclusion of all names of individuals which are placed in our Security Index and in case of disagreement the case will be referred to Assistant Director for decision.

In order that this additional work, which will be considerable in volume, can be handled by Messrs. [name], the following administrative procedures were presented to the Executives' Conference on February 8, 1955:

SUGGESTED PROCEEDINGS:

The Supervisors assigned to the Security Index Unit, after they have completed their review of a case and have decided that the name of the subject should be included in the Security Index, will prepare a memorandum which will set forth briefly and succinctly the facts on which they based their conclusion. The case will then be forwarded, as is now done, to one experienced Supervisor who reviews all cases before the subject's name can be considered for inclusion in the Security Index. He will review the case, as in the past, and from that point an equal division will be made of the cases for review by Messrs. [name]. The memorandum will assist them in their review in that the cases which are clear-cut can be handled in a minimum of time from a review of the memorandum. They will rely completely on the facts set forth in the memoranda in reaching their decisions. In controversial cases they, of course, will review the reports in order to reach a decision.
The Supervisors in the Internal Security Section cannot, for any sustained period, prepare these summary-type memoranda and still keep their work in a current status. They are receiving a large volume of mail and this extra work of having to prepare a memorandum in each case they review will create a delinquency in the Security Index Unit which will be most undesirable. Therefore, in the future, the investigating Agent at the conclusion of his investigation will attach to the Form 122 (this is the form used to recommend the inclusion of a name in the Security Index) a succinct summary of the facts on which he based his recommendation for including the name of the subject in the Security Index. In line with existing instructions, the Special Agent in Charge will personally approve each case wherein a recommendation is made to include the subject's name in our Security Index.

When the report and the Form 122 are received at the Seat of Government, the Supervisors in the Security Index Unit will review the case file as they have done in the past. They will then put an addendum on the summary attached to the Form 122 in which they will indicate any other pertinent factors not listed and indicate their agreement or disagreement with the recommendation from the field. The case will then be sent to the experienced Supervisor in the Security Index Unit who reviews all cases before the names of the subjects can be considered for inclusion in the Security Index and from his desk the cases will be sent to me for review and approval.

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION (Unanimous):

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that the above-outlined procedure be put into effect.

If you agree, there is attached an SAC letter which sets forth instructions to the field with respect to the portions of this procedure which will be implemented by the field.
Office Memorandum

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY & SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

SYNOPSIS:

Each month we follow the field closely on the status of security work by analyzing the backlog of pending cases and delinquency in Espionage, Internal Security, Security Letter and foreign intelligence cases in classifications and . Status of these cases as of January 3, 1955, is set forth herein.

Pending active matters in the entire field in the security classifications decreased substantially from 23,161 to 22,572. Delinquency matters increased from 6,697 to 6,000 with the resultant over-all statistical increase from 28.8 per cent to 29.7 per cent. The delinquent security cases in the New York Office increased from 1,492 to 1,629, increasing delinquency from 26.4 per cent to 27.7 per cent. The number of pending active matters in the classification increased in this New York Office from 4,117 to 4,373 and the delinquent items in this classification increased from 1,232 to 1,332 or statistical delinquency 30.5 per cent.

Although over-all pending and pending active security cases we decreased substantially in January, delinquent cases increased somewhat particularly in some of the 12 large offices noted on page 4 herein. The 40 smaller offices listed on page 7 had a total of 6,216 pending active security cases of which 1,201 were delinquent, approximately 19 per cent as contrasted to 33.6 per cent security delinquency of the 12 large offices, as computed from 5,669 delinquent cases of a total of 16,682 pending active items in those 12 combined offices.

Letters are being sent to the large offices indicated by asterisks on page 4, pointing out to them forcefully that security delinquency must be reduced. Similar letters are being sent to the smaller offices indicated by asterisks on page 7 herein. A total of 13 letters are being sent to the field in this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

The field will continue to be followed closely regarding secur...
delinquency and you will be advised of the results of the review of the February, 1955, administrative reports.

DETAILS:

Since December, 1951, we have been following, on a monthly basis, the twelve field offices having a large proportion of our pending security work and since March, 1952, all offices. We have written letters to the twelve offices and to other offices where progress in reducing the backlog of work and delinquency has not been satisfactory.

The January, 1955, administrative reports from all offices reflect that the total pending active matters in the classifications decreased substantially from 23,181 to 22,878. The delinquent items increased from 6,697 to 6,806, which represents a statistical increase of from 28.8 per cent to 29.7 per cent.

The following statistics reflect the status of pending work including both pending active and pending inactive matters and delinquency for all field divisions as of December 31, 1951, and the progress for the last four months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>TOTAL PENDING MATTERS</th>
<th>CLASSIFICATIONS</th>
<th>ALL FIELD DIVISIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-31-51</td>
<td>10-31-54</td>
<td>11-30-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>1,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32,812</td>
<td>21,911</td>
<td>22,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,895</td>
<td>3,428</td>
<td>3,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,021</td>
<td>26,405</td>
<td>26,947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TOTAL DELINQUENT MATTERS
#### CLASSIFICATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>12-31-53</th>
<th>10-31-54</th>
<th>11-30-54</th>
<th>12-31-54</th>
<th>1-31-55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>925</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,518</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>6,018</td>
<td>5,890</td>
<td>5,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,762</td>
<td>6,413</td>
<td>6,918</td>
<td>6,697</td>
<td>6,806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following statistics reflect the total of pending active matters, delinquency and percentage of delinquency of all offices since January 31, 1953.

### CLASSIFICATIONS

#### ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pending Active Matters</th>
<th>Delinquent Matters</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-31-53</td>
<td>24,098</td>
<td>11,772</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-30-53</td>
<td>22,935</td>
<td>11,233</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-53</td>
<td>23,033</td>
<td>10,890</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-53</td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>9,120</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-53</td>
<td>21,940</td>
<td>9,330</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-53</td>
<td>20,970</td>
<td>9,111</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-53</td>
<td>20,180</td>
<td>8,495</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-53</td>
<td>19,492</td>
<td>7,571</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-53</td>
<td>19,141</td>
<td>5,360</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-53</td>
<td>19,833</td>
<td>6,749</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-53</td>
<td>19,947</td>
<td>6,494</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-53</td>
<td>20,520</td>
<td>7,494</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-54</td>
<td>21,488</td>
<td>6,007</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28-54</td>
<td>21,848</td>
<td>6,617</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-54</td>
<td>21,752</td>
<td>6,757</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-54</td>
<td>21,663</td>
<td>6,822</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-54</td>
<td>22,298</td>
<td>7,407</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-54</td>
<td>22,927</td>
<td>7,050</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-54</td>
<td>22,361</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-54</td>
<td>23,011</td>
<td>6,413</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-54</td>
<td>22,482</td>
<td>6,918</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-54</td>
<td>23,179</td>
<td>6,597</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-54</td>
<td>23,181</td>
<td>6,386</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-54</td>
<td>22,678</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Status of Security Work in Twelve of the Larger Offices

The following statistics reflect the progress of the twelve larger offices we have been closely following since December, 1951. These offices have approximately 60 per cent of the total Security Index cards and a high percentage of the pending work and delinquency in classifications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Security Index Cards 1-14-55</th>
<th>Pending Active Matters 12-31-54</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent 12-31-54</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent 1-31-55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>7,128</td>
<td>5,640</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>4,220</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>2,352</td>
<td>1,814</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Haven</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,850</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,732</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,662</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Letters being sent to offices indicated. See page 8 herein.

The over-all statistics for the eleven offices other than the New York Office since August 31, 1952, are as follows:

- 4 -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pending Matters</th>
<th>Active Matters</th>
<th>Delinquent Matters</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-31-52</td>
<td>12,611</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,589</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-52</td>
<td>11,367</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,732</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-52</td>
<td>11,286</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,957</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-52</td>
<td>11,148</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,844</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-52</td>
<td>10,937</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,576</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-53</td>
<td>10,730</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,696</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28-53</td>
<td>10,721</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,652</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-53</td>
<td>10,669</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-53</td>
<td>9,411</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,889</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-53</td>
<td>9,227</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,442</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-53</td>
<td>8,964</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,232</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-53</td>
<td>8,508</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,618</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-53</td>
<td>8,547</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,249</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-53</td>
<td>8,601</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,106</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-30-53</td>
<td>8,845</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-53</td>
<td>9,434</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,571</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-53</td>
<td>9,552</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,621</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-54</td>
<td>9,814</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,318</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28-54</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,021</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-54</td>
<td>10,188</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,059</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-54</td>
<td>10,201</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-54</td>
<td>9,820</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-54</td>
<td>8,839</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,679</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-54</td>
<td>10,317</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-54</td>
<td>10,048</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,488</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-54</td>
<td>10,669</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,376</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-54</td>
<td>10,557</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,822</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-54</td>
<td>11,053</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,228</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11,092</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-55</td>
<td>10,772</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New York Office**

*In January, 1954, the New York delinquency stood at 53 per cent. It was reduced, however, in February, 1954, to 32 per cent and during the period March through September, 1954, averaged 38 per cent. In October, 1954, the New York security delinquency dropped to 30.9 per cent, on November 30, 1954, to 29.3 per cent, and on December 31, 1954, to 26.4 per cent. The figures in each successive instance representing the lowest percentage of delinquency in the security classifications which had existed in the New York Office since this matter has been followed on a regular basis by the Bureau.*

*New York Office 1954 Annual Report*
The January, 1955, administrative report of the New York Office reveals that security delinquency has increased from 26.4 per cent in December, 1954, the lowest figure ever computed for this office, to 27.7 per cent as of January 31, 1955. The latter figure resulted from increases in both pending active matters from 5,640 to 5,650 and delinquent items, from 1,492 to 1,629.

The New York Office has approximately 25 per cent of the pending active matters in the entire field. This office also has approximately 23.9 per cent of the number of delinquent items in these classifications throughout the field. The average delinquency in all other offices at the end of January, 1955, was approximately 30.5 per cent. The New York delinquency was 27.7 per cent as previously noted.

The bulk of the New York backlog and delinquency is in the classification. During January, 1955, the number of pending active matters in the classification in the New York Office increased from 4,117 to 4,373. The number of delinquent matters in this classification increased from 1,132 to 1,332 with a statistical increase from 29.9 per cent for December, 1954, to 30.5 per cent as of January 31, 1955.

Status of Security Work in the Remaining Forty Offices

The remaining forty offices are listed according to the percentage of delinquency on January 31, 1955, in total matters in classifications. These statistics reflect the progress during January, 1955. It should be noted that many of the smaller offices have no pending matters in classifications and their entire pending backlog is in classification matters.

It was revealed that:
- In October, the period:
- 26.4 per cent
- The lowest percentage had existed from a regular event: the 23rd.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Active Letters</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Little Rock</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Cincinnati</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Baltimore</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Miami</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaha</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma City</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Field</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paso</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albuquerque</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butte</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchorage</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savannah</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Letters sent to offices indicated regarding delinquent status. 
See page 8 herein.
The following figures illustrate the progress of the forty offices as a whole since December 31, 1952, as reflected in the administrative reports:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pending Active Letters</th>
<th>Delinquent Letters</th>
<th>Percentage Delinquent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12-31-52</td>
<td>6,226</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-53</td>
<td>6,080</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-26-53</td>
<td>6,103</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-53</td>
<td>5,970</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-53</td>
<td>5,884</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-53</td>
<td>4,897</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-53</td>
<td>5,611</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-53</td>
<td>5,146</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-53</td>
<td>5,095</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-53</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-53</td>
<td>4,987</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30-53</td>
<td>5,180</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-31-53</td>
<td>5,280</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-54</td>
<td>5,562</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-26-54</td>
<td>5,997</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-31-54</td>
<td>6,079</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30-54</td>
<td>6,174</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-31-54</td>
<td>6,753</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-30-54</td>
<td>7,022</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-31-54</td>
<td>6,910</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-31-54</td>
<td>6,728</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30-54</td>
<td>6,710</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-31-54</td>
<td>6,594</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-31-54</td>
<td>6,767</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-31-55</td>
<td>6,449</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-30-55</td>
<td>6,216</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Letters to the Field**

Although over-all pending and pending active security cases were decreased substantially in January, delinquent cases increased somewhat, particularly in some of the 12 large offices noted on page 4 herein. The 40 smaller offices listed on page 7 had a total of 6,216 pending active security cases of which 1,201 were delinquent, approximately 19 per cent as contrasted to 33.6 per cent security delinquency of the 12 large office as computed from 5,605 delinquent cases of a total of 16,662 pending active items in those 12 combined offices.

Letters are being sent to the large offices indicated by asterisks on page 4, pointing out to them forcefully that security delinquency must be reduced. Similar letters are being sent to the smaller offices indicated by asterisks on page 7 herein. A total of 13 letters are being sent to the field in this ma—
February 17, 1955 Washington, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. \(\text{C-C}\)

(A) SECURITY INDEX - In the future, at the time a Form FD-122 is submitted to the Bureau recommending the inclusion of a name in the Security Index, there must be attached to it an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which you have based your recommendation for including the name in the Security Index. These facts must be in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and the sources from which the information came must be properly characterized as to reliability. The summary must also contain pertinent dates with respect to the activities of the subject.

In those instances when, at the conclusion of a security investigation, you are not recommending the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index, there shall be set forth on the administrative page of the closing report a brief summary statement which will reflect the reasons upon which you have based your decision.
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: 

FROM: 

DATE: 2/17/55

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

This is in response to Mr. 's inquiry about machine listings by Statistical Section that might be requested under an emergency in the Red China situation.

(1) We are recording and can list Chinese aliens and citizens in the index.

(2) Pursuant to memo cited below we are not recording non-Chinese subjects sympathetic to Communist China. This information is being kept in a typed card index in the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Current instructions contained in memo of Mr. to Mr. , 2/3/55, Chinese Communist Activities In The United States, Internal Security - CH and SAC letter Number 5S-14, 2/15/55, paragraph (1).
At a conference in the office of the Attorney General on February 7, 1955, the Attorney General ruled that in the event of an emergency by reason of the Formosa crisis, the Chinese aliens on our Security list should be picked up by the FBI on deportation warrants. Shortly thereafter, warrants of arrest dated February 11, 1955, signed by Acting Attorney General, were delivered to the Bureau. On February 14, 1955, we conferred with Mr. of the Internal Security Division concerning certain procedural questions regarding the execution of the warrants of arrest. These warrants were furnished to our interested Field Offices by letter dated February 15, 1955.

At the request of Mr. Special Agents, Chief of Special Investigations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS; Mr. Assistant Chief of Special Investigations, INS; Mr. Departmental Attorney, and Mr. in the latter's office this afternoon. At that time we again discussed procedures to be followed in executing the deportation warrants. As a result thereof, upon advice of the Immigration representatives the following steps were directed by Mr.:

1. At the time the warrant is served by the Bureau Agents on the Chinese alien, the alien should be advised of his right to counsel and should be advised that the Attorney General is holding him in custody without bond. The alien should be furnished a copy of the warrant and the agent should read to him the charges as they appear on the face of the warrant. The alien should also be advised where he will be held in custody.

2. The alien should then be removed by Bureau Agents to the nearest Federal approved jail and booked for INS.

3. Immediately following the incarceration of the alien, the Bureau Agents should notify the nearest District Director of the INS of the nearest Office.
in Charge of an INS Suboffice, whichever is closest. (For example, if an alien is picked up at Newark and lodged in a Federal approved jail at Newark, notification should be made to the Officer in Charge of the INS Suboffice at Newark, New Jersey, rather than to the District Director of Immigration who is located at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.) At the time of notification the Agent should advise the proper INS official that the alien has been taken into custody upon a warrant for deportation executed by the Attorney General and that the Attorney General has ruled that the alien is to be held without bond. The Agent should also advise where the alien has been incarcerated.

4. Following notification, the original warrant executed by the Bureau Agents should be delivered to the nearest District Director of INS or the nearest Officer in Charge of an INS Suboffice, whichever is closest.

At the meeting the INS representatives raised questions as to the charges which were cited against the various aliens. It was pointed out that probably some of the aliens for whom warrants had been issued were already subjects of deportation proceedings up to a reason of which substantive questions would arise which would have to be resolved between the Department and INS. The INS, at the request of Mr., is presently determining the immigration status of the 36 Chinese aliens and at the urging of Mr. stated that they would have it available for him early next week at which time the Department could then consider each case individually.

The INS representatives also pointed out that in deportation proceedings it was essential to have legally admissible evidence. Mr. stated that when the immigration status of these individuals was ascertained the Department would study this problem with respect to each individual case.

INS representatives stated it would materially expedite their inquiries as to the immigration status of the aliens if they could be furnished with the aliens' current residence addresses. This is so because since INS has decentralized their records, it is necessary for them to make inquiry of their District Directors.
Since the residence addresses of these aliens are readily available at the Bureau, IKS was advised that we would furnish such list to them through liaison. This has been done.

**ACTION:**

(1) There is attached a teletype to our interested Field Offices advising them of the changes in the procedure for executing the warrants.

(2) We are also preparing a letter to Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, to the attention of Mr. , with a carbon copy to IKS, attention Mr. , which will confirm the procedures as outlined above.
The Director instructed in connection with the 2-day Espionage Conference in New York City on February 17 and 18, 1955, that we take this opportunity to also get over the views about care and discriminating screening of the Security Index.

On Thursday morning, February 17, I discussed this problem with the Conference. I pointed out that the maintenance of persons on our Security Index is on the Bureau's responsibility and that the Department is not reviewing such designations. It was emphasized that in the current review of the Security Index, it is imperative that subjects be eliminated if information concerning them is not solid and does not clearly justify their continuance on the Index. I emphasized that in reviewing these cases, the Supervisors and Special Agents in Charge should bear in mind that in the event of a national emergency the subjects will in all probability be jailed for a period of up to thirty days before there is an opportunity for a hearing board to consider the cases and that such incarceration will be strictly the responsibility of the FBI; consequently, maintenance on the Index should be considered in light of the responsibility of the Bureau in taking this action of jailing the subjects on its own responsibility. It was emphasized that when this review is complete there should be no doubts in the minds of the supervising officials and Special Agents in Charge that our Security Index is sound and that apprehensions at the time of a national emergency can be thoroughly justified in all respects. I noted to the Conference that there is no change in the standards by which persons are considered for the Index and that each case must be considered on its own merits.
Assistant Attorney General

Director, FBI

February 21, 1955

SECURITY INDEX LIST-

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of the individuals maintained in the Security Index. Names included in the main portion of the list are arranged alphabetically. The names of individuals coming within five designated groups are listed on separate pages. Following each name is information reflecting the race, sex, birth date, Bureau file number and the Bureau field office covering the residence of the individual.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment (1)

NOTE ON YELLOW COVER:
Espionage Section of the Special Section not included. The five designated groups are:

Foreign Government Employees
United Nations Employees
Pro-Tito Yugoslavs
U. S. Government Employees
Atomic Energy Program Employees

RECORDED 6: FEB 23 1955
Office Memorandum  •  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO:        DATE: 2/1E/55

FROM:      

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  

During the past week 20 cards were added to the Security Index and 6 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 14 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,718.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.
The following is a report of the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on January 14, 1955.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week of</th>
<th>New Cards Added</th>
<th>Cards Cancelled</th>
<th>Net Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 15-21</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 22-28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28-Feb. 4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 5-11</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>(-1) 10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 396 cards were added and 66 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 330 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,704.

ACTION:

This is for your information.
(1) CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES - INTERNAL SECURITY - CH - SECURITY INDEX - In view of the current international situation the Bureau has seriously considered the possibility that instructions may be received to apprehend persons on the Security Index of Chinese extraction and non-Chinese sympathetic to Communist China, in the event of an emergency involving Communist China. Henceforth, in recommending a subject for Security Index who is of Chinese extraction it is essential that you show on the recommendation "Other - Chinese." Similarly, in any communication recommending cancellation of a Security Index card where the person is of Chinese extraction the communication must specifically mention this fact.

With respect to non-Chinese (persons not of Chinese extraction) who have shown definite sympathies with Communist China and who are being recommended for the Security Index you should include a statement on the form (FD-122) under "Miscellaneous" to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China." This statement should be in addition to any other data which you would normally include at this point on the form. This statement should be made only after careful reflection as it will constitute your recommendation that the sympathies of this subject with Communist China are such that he merits consideration for apprehension in the event of an emergency. The Bureau recently solicited your recommendations with respect to existing cases on the Security Index on non-Chinese sympathetic to Communist China and your recommendations have been reviewed. However, your continuing investigations of existing Security Index subjects may develop information on subjects additional to those previously recommended showing definite sympathies with Communist China. On such cases you should direct a communication to the Bureau in the individual case, pointing out the information developed, and submitting your recommendation as to his inclusion in this program.

2/15/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-14
It is possible that any order for the apprehension of Security Index subjects in the event of an emergency with Communist China may be directed solely at aliens or may include citizens. It is absolutely essential that the citizenship status of each subject be definitely verified and that the Security Index card accurately reflect his status at all times.

You should see that all personnel in your office engaged in security work are thoroughly familiar with these instructions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/15/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-14
On February 17, 1953, the Executive Conference recommended favorably as to the suspension of SA
, then assigned
to the Los Angeles Office and now assigned as a supervisor in the Internal Security Section of the Bureau, that when the paper stock for Security Index Cards is next ordered, there be placed on the reverse side along the left-hand margin printed words such as name, weight, height, hair, the eyes and so forth, beside which descriptive data may be entered by the appropriate offices. At that time, there was over a year's supply of plain Security Index Card paper stock on hand.

Printed data in time with the suggestion is now being used for Security Index Cards sent to the field and the Training and Inspection Division has requested to be advised the approximate savings resulting from the use of the printed data on the back of each card.

It is estimated that approximately 30,000 sets of Security Index Cards are sent to the field each year by the Bureau to add new cards or amend cards in existence. Therefore, approximately 30,000 descriptions are typed on the back of Security Index Cards received in the field each year. The printed material consists of 27 words which requires approximately one minute of typing time. This represents a total field savings of 421 days typing time per year or approximately $710 based on a 'grade US-3' typist salary. The additional cost of printing the words on the back of the paper stock is $5. The estimated net savings per year due to this change in procedure is approximately $660.

ACTION:

If you approve, this memorandum should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division for their information.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: 
DATE: 2/25/55

SUBJECT:

With respect to the survey of the Security Index, I would like to personally review the cases of any persons now on the Index wherein the Domestic Intelligence Division proposes to overrule the recommendation of the SAC that the name of the subject be removed from the Index.

Mr. A.B. is regrettable that I was to take on this burden.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

FROM

DATE: 2/21/55

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

There are 26,702 persons represented in the Security Index (as of February 15, 1955). This is a net increase of 105 or \( \frac{3}{10} \) of 1 percent over last month. Of the total, 24,643 or 93.0 percent are communists.

The race of Chinese in the index are now shown separately in the race breakdown on the attached table.

A detailed table is attached in duplicate. The table shows as of February 15, 1955, the distribution of the subjects by field office, nationalistic tendencies, dangerousness, sex, race, and citizenship. Also the number on "special lists" are shown. A key to abbreviations is attached.

Attachments
### Key to Abbreviations Used in Security File

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Alien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Consulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Losing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>Key Figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Naturalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Native Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Top Functionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEP</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Program Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Communist Party, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Espionage Subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGE</td>
<td>Foreign Government Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOV</td>
<td>United States Government Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISL</td>
<td>Independent Socialist League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFG</td>
<td>Johnson Forest Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUI</td>
<td>Muslim Cult of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Proletarian Party of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUA</td>
<td>Socialist Union of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Socialist Workers' Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNE</td>
<td>United Nations Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR</td>
<td>Union of the People for the Establishment of the Republic of Puerto Rico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUG</td>
<td>Yugoslavian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TO: Director, FBI  
FROM: SAC, San Antonio (S)  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX; CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, SOURCES AND WITNESSES  

DATE: February 23, 1955

AIR MAIL


Matters covered in that SAC letter have been discussed in detail with all Relief Supervisors in this office, with each new Agent during weekly conferences and with each headquarters and resident Agent while reviewing cases assigned to those Agents. Memoranda and ticklers have been prepared placing in effect instructions regarding addition of names to the Security Index, recording of indications of unreliability or instability of informants and sources, recording of information furnished by informant and reporting derogatory information concerning prospective witnesses. The entire matter has likewise been scheduled for detailed discussion at the semi-annual Agent's conference to be held April 5, 1955. The Bureau's instructions regarding these protective steps are thus being emphasized and reiterated to all Agents in this Division.
By SAC Letter 55-9 of February 8, 1955, a review of all Security Index cases was initiated. The field was instructed to submit terminal reports each Friday of the progress until the review is completed. Officers below 1,000 Security Index subjects were instructed to complete the project in sixty days. The remaining officers were instructed to complete the review in ninety days with the exception of New York which is to complete this project within six months.

There were 26,718 subjects included in the Security Index as of February 13, 1955.

The figures of February 18, 1955, from the field reflect that 1,503 cases have been reviewed as of that date, approximately 5.6 per cent, and the required data forwarded to the Bureau.

As of February 24, 1955, 262 cases have been

ACTION:
You will be kept advised of the progress of the reviews on a weekly basis.
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: [Blank]

FROM: [Blank]

DATE: March 1, 1955

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX REVIEW

File

Attached is my memorandum of February 24, 1955, pertaining to captioned project. It is stated that as of February 24, 1955, 262 cases have been analyzed and processed in the Internal Security Section. Further, of the 262 cases, nine cancellations had been recommended by the SAC's and approved for cancellation in the review at the Bureau. Mr. [Name] has noted: "If this is typical of the results of this processing, we will have to try a different approach."

The Director commented: "I certainly agree. Div. is not critically screening these. Just how many of the 262 were recommended by the SAC's for cancellation? H."

In response to the Director's inquiry, nine cases of the 262 processed were recommended for cancellation by the SAC's. In other words, every recommendation for cancellation made by the SAC's in the 262 cases was concurred in at the Bureau with no exceptions.

In response to Mr. [Name]'s comment that we will have to try a different approach, this is to advise that I recommended to the Executives' Conference today certain specific guides to be sent to the field for use in evaluating the Security Index cases. The recommendation, which was approved by the Executives' Conference, is being submitted by a separate memorandum.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to: TAC BUN
FBI, INDIANAPOLIS 2-25-55 7:00 PM CST HH

DIRECTOR, FBI

SECURITY INDEX LEVEL 3: FBI SAC LETTER 55-5, DATED FEBRUARY 3, 1955. IF
HAS TOTAL OF 275 SI CARD SUBJECTS. AS OF FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 60 HAVE
BEEN COMPLETED AND REQUIRED DATA SENT BUREAU.
AIRTEL

Transmit the following message to:

FBI, LOS ANGELES 2/25/55

DIRECTOR, FBI

SECURITY INDEX REVIEW. RE SAC LETTER 55-6. TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES TO BE
REVIEWED AT BEGINNING - 4216. TOTAL COMPLETED AS OF 2/25/55 - 495.
BALANCE TO BE DOKE - 3721.
Transmit the following Teletype message to:

FBI, SPRINGFIELD

DIRECTOR, FBI

SECURITY INDEX REVIEW: RE SAG LETTER 55-8, DATED 2-2-55.

1. TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES TO BE REVIEWED - 92.

2. TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES DATA FOW-ARDED TO BUREAU - 19.
Office Memorandum  

TO:  

FROM:  

DATE: 2/25/55  

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  

During the past week 43 cards were added to the Security Index and 13 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 30 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,748.

ACTION: None. This is for your information.
SUGGESTION: Due to current Bureau instructions that require certification by the field of the correctness of each Security Index card, many files will be analyzed in the immediate future in which it will appear logical and necessary to interview the subject to resolve the correctness of the SI classification. It is suggested in such cases that authority be given the SAC to direct Agents to conduct interviews.

Its advantages are: The SAC will be familiar with the facts involved in each situation and will be in a position to interview the subject to resolve the correctness of the SI classification. An interview would be conducted with the subject being interviewed in the office of the agent, both at the Bureau and in the field. In addition to the monetary saving incidental to the saving of employee time, the quality of the SI will be established much sooner.

It should save at least $2,000,000 annually.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of any further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of Suggester)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

Since certification of the correctness of the Security Index is a deadline matter, this suggestion deserves favorable consideration.

(Signature of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director)
TO

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY NUMBER TE-65
(AELIMINATION OF BUREAU AUTHORITY
PRIOR TO INTERVIEWS WITH SECURITY
SUBJECTS)

Special Agent

of the San Francisco
Office has recommended that in view of current Bureau Instructions
which require certifications by the field of the correctness of
each Security Index card, new files will be analyzed in the
immediate future, in which it will appear logical and necessary
to interview the subject to resolve the question as to whether
his name should be retained in the Security Index. He suggests
that in such cases authority should be delegated to the Special
Agent in Charge to direct Agents to conduct interviews.

The SAC of the San Francisco Office feels that this
suggestion deserves favorable consideration since certification
of the correctness of the Security Index is a deadline manner.

The Executives Conference on September 27, 1954,
considered the above suggestion and recommended unanimously
that the present procedure of requiring Bureau authority prior
to interviewing subjects not be changed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and
Inspection Division to indicate that the Internal Security Section
does not favor the adoption of the above suggestion.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #75-55
MADE BY SAC
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

DATE: 2/23/55

SUGGESTION: Due to current Bureau instructions that require certification by the field of the correctness of each Security Index card, many files will be analyzed in the immediate future in which it will appear logical and necessary to interview the subject to resolve the correctness of the Security Index classification. It is suggested in such cases that authority be given the SAC to direct Agents to conduct interviews.

ADVANTAGES: The suggester states the SAC will be familiar with the facts involved in each situation and will be in a position to instruct or interview the subject with a considerable saving in time in order to resolve the correctness of such Security Index classification. A saving would be effected in stenographic and clerical time, both at the Bureau and in the field. In addition to the monetary saving incidental to the saving of employee time, the quality of the Security Index will be established much sooner.

DISADVANTAGES: None noted by suggester.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC, San Francisco, feels this suggestion deserves favorable consideration.

Mr. Domestic Intelligence Division, agrees with the unfavorable recommendation of Mr. Mr. points out that the Executives Conference on September 27, 1954, considered the above suggestion and recommended unanimously that the present procedure of requiring Bureau authority prior to interviews with security subjects not be changed.

Inasmuch as the Bureau's position is obvious, this matter will not be presented to the Executives Conference unless you so instruct. Mr. has already been thanked for submitting this suggestion.
RECOMMENDATION:

Inasmuch as the Executives Conference unfavorably considered this matter as recently as September 27, 1964, it is recommended that this suggestion not be adopted.
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO:  MR. A. H.  
FROM:  MR.  
DATE:  2/17/55  

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX LIST

The Security Index list as of 2/15/55, has been prepared. One copy is attached herewith for transmittal to the SAC, Quantico, for retention in his personal custody with the other vital records maintained at the FBI Academy.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That this memorandum and attached list be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, marked Personal and Confidential, Registered, Return Receipt Requested.

2. That upon receipt, the SAC, Quantico, place the attached list with the other vital records maintained at Quantico, personally destroy by burning the old Security Index list in his possession and note hereon that such action has been taken.

3. That thereafter, this memorandum be returned to the Bureau, marked for my attention.

Attachment (1)  RECORDED - 69
WOO:mit  (6)  EX.112  13 MAR 2 1955
cc - Lt.  
cc - Lt.  
cc - SAC,  
cc - Lt.  

13 MAR 7 1955
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: 
FROM: 
DATE: 3/4/55

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 9 cards were added to the Security Index and 70 cards were cancelled, a net decrease of 61 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,687.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.
Attached hereto is a rough draft letter from Hughes Aircraft's Company at Silver City, Calif., which has been prepared by that company and forwarded to this office to ascertain whether the Bureau has any objections to a policy which Hughes wishes to adopt.

The Plant Protection Division of Hughes Aircraft Company is actively recruiting highly-trained engineering personnel from various sections of the country. They have advised that they realize that some of the personnel they hire might be missing security subjects from other field offices in the Bureau who have allowed themselves the opportunity of becoming employed by Hughes in California to completely drop from sight in their home cities.

Both Mr. and Mr. , who are heads of the plant security setup at Hughes, are ex-Bureau personnel and are fully aware of the confidential nature of the Bureau's files. Both Messrs. and are extremely cooperative with the Los Angeles Office and, as a matter of information, forward a large amount of data which they accumulate in their own investigations which they think might be of interest to this office.

The proposed letter is under no circumstances to be considered as a request for information. The letter is merely to be forwarded to the various field offices where the subject might have resided when he was hired. According to Mr. , this is not a wholesale project on the part of Hughes but will be done in only those cases where there is derogatory information which has been brought to light in the course of background investigations conducted by them which are necessary to clear their employees.

Mr. , who contacted the office, was advised that this matter would be referred to the Bureau for an opinion and that he would be appropriately advised as to whether or not the Bureau objected to his organization's adopting such a policy.
Dear Sir:

The Hughes Aircraft Company is a key facility engaged in the research, development, and production of fire control systems, guided missiles, and other electronic devices for the armed forces. The Office of Special Investigations, 18th District, Cheli Air Force Depot, Maywood, California has security cognizance.

It should be noted that all employees of this Company are cleared for access to confidential data; many are cleared for access to top secret; in some instances, clearances are given to top secret. Hence, the need for care in the selection of personnel is obvious.

Since the F.B.I. is charged with the investigation of violations of Espionage, Sabotage, and related matters, we are taking this means of bringing to your attention that captioned individual:

( ) Has made application for employment here,
( ) Was employed here on (Date) as a (Position).

The subject's attached P.S.Q reflects that he (she) resided in your area for a period of time. It, therefore, is possible that you may have information which would assist the Government in arriving at a decision relative to the subject's clearance for access to classified information. It is stressed that this organization realizes that your records are confidential, and has no desire to be advised in this matter. Our only thought is to assist the Bureau in the fulfillment of its obligations, and to assure that this individual's employment is clearly consistent with the best interests of national security.

In the event information of an unfavorable nature is discovered here concerning this individual, your Los Angeles Division will be advised.

Yours very truly,

[Signature]

Director of Industrial Security
Mr.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
510 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, California

RE: INFORMATION LETTERS TO YOUR OFFICES

Dear:

Reference is made to our telephone conversation February 16
at 8:16 a.m., at which time I discussed the possibility of our
sending information letters to Bureau offices covering prior residence
of our applicants whose application papers reflect Russian
or satellite background.

My thinking is based on the understanding that many indivi-
duals in this category have subversive records; employment or
application for employment in a defense industry enhances the sig-
nificance of such subversive records; transfer of "run of the mill"
subversives from one state or locality to another would not neces-
sarily be brought to your attention; such transfer, if it involves
seeking employment in a defense facility, might be of interest to
the Bureau office covering prior residence to the extent that they
would wish to reopen their case and submit any information in their
possession to your office for your consideration and action.

In view of the above, I am enclosing a rough draft copy of
the letter we propose to send to Bureau offices subject, of course,
to your complete approval.

After you have examined the contents of this letter and at-
tachment, I will welcome an opportunity to further discuss the
matter with you.

Yours very truly,
The form letter attached to refer to be put on order of which it was prepared cannot be enclosed. The appearance of the letter would add an additional administrative burden on the Bureau. The use of such a form letter appears to be an attempt by Hughes Aircraft Company to develop a direct access to Bureau files in any matter in which they may be concerned. You are well aware that we cannot have such a development exist. In addition, the form letter proposed is undesirable on its own merits since it appears to violate and is contrary to the provisions of the Mutual Security Agreement, the only procedure through which the requests for civil investigations (DCI), United States Air Force which has security responsibility at Hughes Aircraft Company. With a request of DCI, none of these are made of the Bureau, either from one or other or other person in developing, DCI must refer the case to us for investigation. The form letter proposed appears to be solicited by a desire to circumvent the DCI and allow Hughes Aircraft Company to refer matters directly to the Bureau. This would furnish Hughes Aircraft Company the opportunity of new letter date to state they had referred the matter to the FBI.

You should advise, (1) the form letter cannot be accepted by the FBI and (2) that the best interest of all concerned will best be served through continued proper coordination with DCI which has security responsibilities at Hughes Aircraft Company.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

FBI HEADQUARTERS 3-4-55 AIRMAIL

DIRECTOR, FBI

SECURITY INDEX REVIEW. RE SAC LET 55-8. (1) TOTAL NUMBER
OF CASES TO BE REVIEWED - 139. (2) NUMBER OF CASES IN WHICH
REQUIRED DATA FORWARD TO BUREAU TO DATE - 36.
Transmit the following Teletype message to:

FBI, CHARLOTTE (100-6662) 3-4-55  AIRTEL

1. TOTAL CASES TO BE REVIEWED DURING PROJECT 47.

2. NUMBER CASES IN WHICH REQUIRED DATA FORWARD TO BUREAU 47.
Attached is JAC Letter Number 55-15 (page one) of 2/17/55 providing that at the time a Form FD-122 is forwarded to the Bureau recommending a subject for the Security Index, there must be attached to it an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which such recommendation is based. Further, it provides that in a case in which the subject is not being recommended for the Security Index, that the administrative page of the closing report shall contain a brief summary statement which reflects the reasons upon which such decision is based.

Proposed manual changes are attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached proposed changes will be made in the Manual of Instructions. The FBI Handbook and the Manual of Rules and Regulations are not affected in this matter.

This was approved by Exec. Conf.

Memo 2-14-55
(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In the future, at the time a Form FD-122 is submitted to the Bureau recommending the inclusion of a name in the Security Index, there must be attached to it an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which you have based your recommendation for including the name in the Security Index. These facts must be in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and the sources from which the information came must be properly characterized as to reliability. The summary must also contain pertinent dates with respect to the activities of the subject.

In those instances when, at the conclusion of a security investigation, you are not recommending the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index, there shall be set forth on the administrative page of the closing report a brief summary statement which will reflect the reasons upon which you have based your decision.
February 21, 1955

PROPOSED CHANGES

SECTION 080

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Page 29a-b - Under the heading "(4) Recommendations for, and preparation of Security Index cards," the following should be inserted following the existing first paragraphs:

"At the time a Form 70-173 is submitted to the Board in connection with inclusion of a name in the Security Index, there should be attached to it a sheet of paper listing the name and address of the person on which the name is included, and such other data as the Board may require for purposes of the Security Index cards. The purpose of the Security Index cards is merely to serve as the means of identification of an individual, and not as a means of keeping a person's file. The information furnished on the Security Index cards should not be considered as being confidential, and should not be treated as such.

In some instances, however, at the conclusion of a criminal action, or at the termination of a criminal investigation, the Board may, in its discretion, publish a Security Index card to indicate the conclusion of the investigation or the reason for the inclusion of the name on the card.

Under the heading 6(1)(a) pertaining to "Investigative reports" insert the following as the third and separate paragraph immediately preceding the heading "(b) Summary reports":

 Upon completion of a security investigation of an individual not already included in the

Eve 2
Security Index, the procedure outlined in 727.2 (b) should be added to the Table of Contents and included in the

.reasons given for inclusion in the security

administration and in the closing report

a brief summary of the significant findings made at the

EIV - 3 -
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: 
FROM: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: Feb. 25, 1955

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

In connection with the review of the entire Security Index which is currently being made by the field, we are receiving thousands of letters from our field offices which contain recommendations regarding the continuance or deletion of subjects from our Security Index.

In order that consistent evaluation will be afforded to the recommendations made by the various field offices after the Bureau Supervisor reviews the field recommendation, his work will be reviewed by Supervisor in Charge of the Security Index Unit. Each of these three men is eminently qualified to handle this assignment and it would be physically impossible for Supervisor...to review all of these cases alone; especially, since he along with Inspector...and Section Chief...of the Internal Security Section are personally passing on all new additions to the Security Index.

Mr. is also personally handling all cancellations from the Security Index.

This system has been set up in order that we may keep as current as possible with the tremendous volume which is being received in the Internal Security Section while at the same time affording careful consideration to each individual case.
This memorandum is to record the discussions had at the conference held in the Attorney General's Office on the Justice Department Building on the subject of Chinese immigration and hostilities. In attendance at this meeting were the Attorney General, the Director, and the following were present:

From the Department - Deputy Attorney General, Legal Counsel, and Counsel.

From Immigration and Naturalization Service - General Counsel.

From FBI -

The Attorney General followed the advice in the report of the General Counsel, and stated there were about 16,000 non-immigrant Chinese in the United States, of which approximately 5,000 are students. As such, there were about 11,000 Chinese who are permanent residents, or about 45,000 Chinese aliens in the United States, of Immigration and Naturalization Service. Of these, as of February 7th, only about 20% were college students and scientists. The Director reported that about 40% of the college students and scientists had been temporarily recalled from leaving this country, due to the current situation, and therefore, it would be very desirable that we uphold our
The Director further pointed out that under the revised portfolio the arrest of dangerous aliens and a number of other functions performed during World War II by the United States Attorneys and the FBI have been placed under the jurisdiction of the FBI. The Attorney General questioned the wisdom of this move after discussing the success of the Attorney General in keeping the dangerous individuals under an emergency program should be the function of the FBI and the portfolio of the Attorney General is to issue such orders.

8. Chinese on Security Index

The Director stated that there are 101 persons of Chinese national extraction in this country on the Security Index, and that the FBI will be checking them. The Director pointed out that as to the citizens, he pointed out that they could be arrested unless the FBI cooperated on the evidence of these cases in the event of an emergency, which was what they were doing in implementing the entire Security Index program.

After discussion, the Attorney General agreed that in the event of a Roosevelt emergency, the FBI should be able to act in accordance with the provisions of the act. The Director pointed out that he had located all of the aliens mentioned above within the last 48 hours.
C. Chinese in the United States

The Director stated that of the Chinese employed at the UN, our investigations led to the conclusion that the Department of State issued on January 1, 1955, that the Chinese employed by the UN Secretariat should be treated as citizens of the United States, a conclusion that would be consistent with the Geneva Convention. However, for the purposes of dealing with Assistant Attorney General and the Department of State, we would have to conform with Assistant Attorney General and the Department of State.

The Attorney General agreed with the procedure.

D. Non-Chinese on the Security Index Who Are Sympathetic to Communist China

The Director stated that there are non-Chinese on our Security Index who are not Chinese but who are strongly sympathetic to Communist China. The Director stated that these would be treated in the same manner as American citizens of Chinese extraction and, therefore, the FBI would increase and intensify its coverage in that in the event of an emergency.

The Attorney General agreed.

E. Status of Portfolio

Mr. a explained that the FBI's portfolio office is working on the Portfolio and is re-working the revised Portfolio in line with the comments made by the FBI. He said it would be necessary to take the matter up again with FBI. The Director stated that the question of re-working the Portfolio has been settled by the Attorney General, who was to make a long discussion with FBI. The Attorney General asked when this would be completed. He said that Part II was practically finished, but that Part I would be done in the next few weeks and he would try to complete the Portfolio by February 16. Meanwhile, the Attorney General stated that the Portfolio as it existed prior to the revision would be operative in the event of an emergency.

The Director pointed out that the revised Portfolio contains a number of fundamental changes to which would take
arrangements and as to decisions and control of the alien enemy programs that were in place during the last war, these functions were seen as central to FDR, rather than generally, as with the United States Attorneys and the FBI. The Director pointed out that the provision that provided for this procedure in the regulations was as follows: 

The Director pointed out that it was of utmost importance to resolve this matter, that responsibilities in an emergency would be clearly understood and carried out.

The Attorney General stated that the main part of the program was to locate, control, and identify enemy aliens, and that the responsibility for this lay with the Attorney General. The Director verified this, and the portfolio being produced, the Attorney General stated that the Department had one copy, and the FBI had one copy. It was verified that it was so far as the FBI was concerned.

1. Executive Order 5107, dated June 25, 1941, Security Zones Operations, etc., in the Area of Military Law

2. Executive Order 6113, dated June 25, 1941, Security Zones Operations, etc.

The Attorney General, and the Director, verified this.

It is well to have some idea of the law. However, the Attorney General stated that the Executive Order should be read carefully to be used in the situation desired. It is an order delineating what is done in the District, etc., in the event of an emergency, thus it would prepare aids.
(0) As we are checking with the intention to be the most accurate and valid information, I would like to include all the necessary data and details in our discussion.
(c) Security Index -- The Bureau has approved a suggestion made by
a field employee that the descriptive data presently appearing on
the back of Security Index cards (in geographical section of the
Index) be placed instead on separate card which will be securely
attached to the Security Index card by staples. When a revised
Security Index card is received from the Bureau and no changes
are necessary in the descriptive data, the separate card can be
removed and attached to the back of the new Security Index card to
be filed in the geographical section of the Index. This will elimi-
nate the necessity for retyping the descriptive data each time the
Security Index card is revised.

It is not desired that a project be undertaken to prepare
separate cards for all Security Index cards. The change in pro-
cedure should be made at the time of the next revision in each card.
As each card comes up for revision, the Security Index data appearing
on the card being replaced should be accurately crossed out, and
the back of the card being replaced already contains the necessary de-
scriptive data; therefore, if no change is required in it, the back
of the card being replaced can serve as the separate card which is
to be stapled to the new Security Index card. This will make it
unnecessary to retype the descriptive data on another card.

Where a new Security Index card is received from the Bureau
on a person not presently listed, or where a change is required in
descriptive data on an existing card, the necessary descriptive data
should be typed on a separate 5x8 card which will be attached by
staples to the back of the Security Index card. For use in such
instances, you should obtain from the Bureau an adequate supply of
these cards on which have been printed the same descriptive items
now appearing on the back of the Security Index card. The subject's
photograph will, of course, be attached to the separate descriptive
card.

It is intended that the separate card bearing the descrip-
tive data continue to be filed with the copy of the Security Index
card which is placed in the geographical section of the Index.

1/7/55
SAC Letter No. 55-19

Appropriate manual changes will be made to reflect this new method
of maintaining the descriptive data and photograph, but the procedure
of using the replaced card as the separate card upon the Inauguration
of the new method will not be set out in the manual since eventually
there will be no replaced Security Index cards usable in this
manner.
March 8, 1955

SECURITY INDEX - File

Attached is a letter from SEC of San Francisco

consisting with the current review of Security Index cases. It was

requested that, based on the personal

review of new 280 Security Index cards, it was found that the

cases are often idiosyncratic and not consistent with the structure

shown. The overall plan of Security Index subjects, the existing

over-all number of Security Index cards and the lack of

standardization of reviews, make review of the

security index at the March and April conferences desirable.

Concerning the March 7, 1955, meeting procedures, modifications in security

Index standards

(a) With regard to the second recreation

concerning the maintenance of cancelled Security Index cards, it 

is noted that cancelled cards are in fact filed according to the

existing action. In the statistical section, when the review of

the new Index forms is not possible, the review may be

separate action under the separate section cards and for each cancelled card

specifically or if cancelled cards are subsequently issued, the most recent cards

may always be made to serve this purpose. The most recent cards

should be general review to be done necesary.

(b) With regard to the individuals

whose Security Index cards have been cancelled, it is noted that

regularly, yearly or every eighteen months, to determine whether

or not, their activity has increased to the point that they

should be transferred to the Security Index, and vitality, if

could be given else to developing them as potential interesting.

If the Department agrees with our

proposed new criteria, we will consider

having the field keep the cancelled

cards separately for future reference.

The field will be advised on this

procedure, if approved, when the new

criteria are sent to the field, so it

be instituted immediately.
I do not believe that this particular suggestion should be followed. First of all, the administrative order in running ticklers on the complains cases would present a troublesome problem. Secondly, should one of these individuals again become active in a subversive group, the office order would bring him to appropriate attention. For instance, should a subject be removed from the Security Index in March 1955, in June 1956 an investigation identifies the subject an engaged in Communist activities and a recommendation channelled to the subject's case file. This recommendation will come to the attention of the Security Supervisor and at that point the case will be reopened for investigation.

It is further noted that we resolve the informant possibilities of each subject in working these cases. No person is removed from the Security Index until he has been interviewed unless, of course, there are specific overriding considerations which dictate against interview.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, there is attached a letter to SAC McGuin acknowledging his memorandum of March 1, 1959, and commenting upon his suggestions in line with the foregoing observations.
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.  

March 1, 1955

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In your talk with me in January, you emphasized that there is a need to review the Security Index cases, keeping in mind always that 1) we must protect the security of the nation on the one hand and 2) we must not open ourselves to criticism by having persons on the Security Index who do not belong there. It was your view that the number of persons on the Security Index at the present time should be substantially reduced.

Since returning to the office, I have reviewed approximately 200 Security Index cases. I don't know what the experience of the other field offices is in this regard but I would say generally that the recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and which have been concurred in by the Bureau, are overwhelmingly in accord with the standards which we have set up in our regulations.

I would respectfully and very seriously like to suggest and recommend that, if we are to reduce the over-all number of persons who are on the Security Index, to do it in an objective manner, the first step should be a revision of the standards which we consider sufficient to place a person upon the Security Index. In all frankness, I must admit that this is a change in my thinking. I had previously recommended to Mr. , when he inquired, that I didn't think a change in the standards was appropriate or necessary.

The Bureau has taken already one step in this direction by establishing the new standards for those persons who are to be given a majority of appreciation designation. The details of how the standards should be revised can be accomplished by those who are familiar with the problem.

I would further like to suggest that the Security Index Cards of the subjects whom we delete or cancel under the new standards be maintained separately. The files on these people could be reviewed perhaps every year or eighteen months to determine
whether or not their activity has increased to the point where they should be reclassified to the security index, and consideration could be given also to developing them as potential informants. If the cold war becomes more intense, we might want more day to be able to identify in a more this group of people on whom we have some substantial information upon which to questioned their loyalty. The FBI could have already been warned on these people and, by maintaining them in a separate section, we could be able to continue to have control of them and have the information on these cards at our fingertips.

Very truly yours,

Special Agent in Charge
Reference is made to your letter of March 1, 1967, commenting upon the review of Security Index cases.

You note that you have reviewed approximately 200 Security Index cases and have found that too many were unreasonably in accord with the standards as they existed at the present time. You have suggested that, if the overall number of persons in the Security Index is to be reduced, existing standards should be revised.

For your information, this matter is under study at the Bureau. You will be advised promptly of any developments in this matter.

You have suggested that the Security Index cards of the subjects removed from the Security Index as a result of any revision of the standards be maintained separately. The Security Index cards of persons removed from the Security Index are maintained separately at the Bureau under existing procedure. Since each cancelled card bears the date of cancellation, it will be possible at a later date to recover the files of these subjects on a systematic basis should an emergency situation exist. Upon receipt of the matter of revised Security Index standards, consideration will be given to separate maintenance by the field of cancelled Security Index cards for future reference.

Regarding your suggestion that the files of the cancelled subjects be reviewed periodically, this matter would entail a tremendous administrative burden in your office if following these cases. It is observed that should any of the cancelled subjects resume their activities in subversive areas, your informant service should have prior appropriate notice in your office. Assume, for instance, that a given subject is removed from the Security Index in March 1965. If an informant in June 1965 should report his subject as active in the Communist Party, the investigation would, at that point, be reopened in your office and appropriate recommendations made to the Bureau concerning his Security Index status.
Lastly, it is noted that, upon the reviewed periodic review of cancelled security index cards, consideration might be given to developing those persons to essential informants. You are reminded that under existing circumstances security index cards are not cancelled unless the subjects can be considered for essential work. In recent years, in fact, interviewed units have included factors which indicate against the desirability of protection in individual cases. In other words, the informant potential of each security index subject is examined in connection with cancellation of the security index card.

Your comments and observations in this matter are appreciated.
By SAC Letter Number 55-12 of 2/10/55, attached, comprehensive changes were made in Security Index procedures regarding the priority changes. The classification of "Comsat" by which certain subjects were previously designated was discontinued entirely. Instead, the Betcom classification was established as the single basis of priority and that persons classified will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.

Attached are Annual changes which are required under the changes brought about by the above SAC Letter. These changes relate exclusively to provisions under Section 87c of the Manual of Instructions and pertain to numerous phases of the Security Index Program which have now been altered pursuant to the aforementioned SAC Letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached proposed changes will be made in Section 87c of the Manual of Instructions.
page 30a - Item VI should be restated as follows:

VI. Excerpted classification (except as to Detainee)

page 30b - After the heading (b) (vi) "The T-Crimes Section," insert the following at the first line of separate paragraphs.

"Procedures for the classification of the various offenses for which a person is to be detained ..."

page 30c - The third full paragraph beginning "When a subject is scheduled for priority apprehension ......." should be eliminated in its entirety.

page 30d - Under the heading "II. Added Section," insert the following at the beginning of the paragraph immediately preceding the new heading "VI. Special Section."

"Procedures for the classification of the T-Crimes Section of the T-Crimes Section."

page 30e - The first paragraph, beginning "When a Special Section subject ......." should be amended to read as follows:

"When a Special Section subject is scheduled for priority apprehension under the section mapping the Special Section card shall be appropriately marked."

page 30f - The fourth paragraph, beginning "When a Special Section subject ......." should be eliminated in its entirety.
In first paragraph after item (8) amend to read as follows:

Once a security index card has been prepared, any information developed which affects the name appearing on the security index card must be promptly submitted to the Bureau of Narcotics. Any change, omission, or addition involves the name, address, and number of the organizational affiliation or department, the number and agency security identification number, and any other information relative to the security identification number and agency. The security identification number and security identification abbreviation (see (8) (c) (1)) below as will be found in the classification table. Any change in the office of origin will be effected by submission of Form 30-112.
Upon the transfer of office of origin of a subject who has been coded for detention, the Security Index card will remain coded in the new office of origin as it was in the old office of origin. This shall apply to all branches including those concerned Key figures and top functionaries as well as cases carried under the Security index - C classification or cases carried under any other character such as Espionage - A or Internal Security - D.

The Security Index card shall continue to be talked for priority apprehension in the new office of origin until such time as it is determined by receipt of information by that office that the priority designation is not warranted under the provisions of Section 22 of the Security Index card.

The only exception to the above instructions should be deleted in its entirety.

(11) Priority Apprehension Program (PAP)

(11) Purpose

Many initiatives included in the Security Index card have been developed and implemented to improve the effectiveness of the program. Among these initiatives, the Priority Apprehension Program (PAP) has been particularly effective in deterring the involvement of individuals in espionage activities. The PAP focuses on identifying and apprehending suspects who pose a threat to national security.

Through a combination of intelligence analysis and investigative efforts, the PAP has been successful in preventing the disclosure of sensitive information to foreign agents. By focusing on high-risk individuals, the PAP has helped to reduce the number of espionage cases that have been reported.

The PAP has also provided valuable training to law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies, ensuring that they are equipped to handle espionage threats effectively. The program has been recognized for its innovative approach and has received positive feedback from both domestic and international partners.

Despite its successes, the PAP continues to face challenges. Changes in the global landscape require constant adaptation to stay ahead of potential threats. The program is continually reviewed and revised to ensure that it remains effective in the face of evolving threats.

The PAP plays a crucial role in safeguarding national security and protecting the interests of the nation. Through its commitment to excellence, the PAP remains a leading example of how proactive measures can be taken to combat espionage and safeguard the confidentiality of sensitive information.
care implied to consist or capable of
consideration. I have been aware of this
for some time. I think, however, that the
objects of the inquiry are not limited to
consideration, but that the inquiry is
intended to determine the merits of the
question raised.

It is claimed that the individuals in the
Security, as such, are not entitled to
receive the benefits of the inquiry. It is
alleged that the individuals are not of
the Security, and, therefore, it will not
be conducted upon their interests.

In the event of an alleged breach by
officials, the Security, or officials in the
Security, as such, will be considered for
inquiries or prosecutions.

Subjects tabulated for persons should
comprise
- the Security, as such,
- all
- the Security, in its entirety,
- the Security, as regulated by
- the Security, under the
- the Security, as conducted by

(b) Subjects to be tabulated

Each Security, under subject should be considered
for reason: career (officer or employee) and
within the Security, under subject.

I. All Security personnel and key figures

II. Currently active employees (active within
the Security)
(a) Influence local employers or, at the least, inculcate Communist philosophy.

(b) Cool deliberation or the party school
or be present in the classroom.

(c) Membership or violent action,
active or passive in the Communist party, in
any official capacity, or any activity
related.

(d) Violent statements or strong
public statements by their representatives.

(e) Persons active in Communist Party
organizations.

(f) Any other security index subject
para 30, section 1, subsection B,
to be placed on suspicion.

(person has been placed on suspicion,
and should not be handling any
official or confidential information.

ENC 5
Recommending for and Removal of Deter

I. Approval of Special Agent in Charge

The designation of each subject for a Deter requires the approval of the

Director of the Deter, or his designee. This approval shall not be granted

without the recommendation of the Security Officer of the Special Agent

involved. The recommendation should include a statement that the

Security Officer has consulted with the Special Agent. The Security

Officer shall forward a copy of this recommendation to the

Director of the Deter, the Director of the Special Agent, and the

Secretary of the Deter. The recommendation should be in

CIC 713 (a)

II. Key Figure and Top Managerial Conco

As noted in (a) and (c), it is

recommended that the original

recommendation be either a

Key Figure or a Managerial Conco.

Enc 6
In order that the security index card for the applicant be maintained in proper condition, the following steps are recommended:

I. Each security index card should be updated for each change of job assignation, and

II. Concurrent election

The index card is used to record the completion of any significant event and is a valuable source of information.
III. Alphabetical Section

One security index card for each subject

A colored tab will be affixed to each security

As section tabbing are removed at the beginning

IV. Special Section and Transferable Section

Security Index cards of "secret subjects" and

Enc 8
(e) General

I. Setting of Cards

In Security Cards will contain as for record cards in Sec. 14 of this
paragraph for both.

II. Cards from Index Category

Particular attention must be given to cards
in this category which are in the Security Index
file. The Security Index file is compiled
mainly from the Security Index cards kept in
the file. It is therefore necessary to
check each card in this file to
make sure that it is correct.

Page 33a — Under the heading "(2) Inclusion in the Security Index,"
the fourth paragraph beginning "The Security Index
card for each key security subject ** should be
deleted in its entirety.

Page 33a — First paragraph on the page beginning "If a subject
discontinued ** should be deleted in its entirety.

Under the heading "(1) General" the following should
be inserted as the fourth and separate paragraph:

As noted under Sec. 28 (11) herein, the Security
Index card for each key security subject
must be kept in the file. Consequently

Page 35 — Under the heading "(1) Designation and deletion of Key
Figure Subjects," the following should be inserted
as the first and separate paragraph:

The following conditions shall be used in
connection with Sec. 28 (11) and the
items which are to be noted in the security
index as a result.
An individual is designated a Key Figure by the Field Office by directing a letter to the Bureau advising that an individual has been so classified. Deletions are made in the same manner. The letter designating or deleting a Key Figure should carry the name of the subject in the caption and contain a brief statement as to the reason for such designation or deletion.

Each office must maintain a list of Key Figures including top functionaries. The list may be kept by a simple list system, by maintaining a file wherein all additions and deletions to the list are reported or by a card index system. The number of Key Figures a particular office has will govern the method which is used. The Bureau does not dictate, however, that the Security Index card of Key Figures be tabbed except to indicate the position classification of each in (11) herein. The Key Figure List should be maintained separate from the Security Index.

Immediately after the heading "(3) Top Functionaries" at the bottom of the page, the following should be inserted as a separate paragraph:

The following regulations should be read in conjunction with (11) herein pertaining Attention is directed in reference to (11), "functionary subjects,"
Any reference to the Companies Index, Security Index, file numbers, titles of other cases, priority, appreciation program,aton classification, Key Figure or -on, Stationary assets, Security Index Notice (JS-105), Form 5-103 and 5-104, Bureau Instructions for handling cases, or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature but refers to the administrative handling of the case.
In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

February 10, 1955  WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In view of recent developments in the international situation it has become necessary to re-evaluate the priority of arrest features of our Security Index Program. At the present time subjects who will be considered for priority of arrest at the time of an emergency are tabbed Detcon and the Detcon classification includes subjects who are tabbed Comsaab.

Henceforth, it is planned that the individuals in the Security Index tabbed Detcon will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. It is not anticipated at this time that the other subjects in the Security Index will be arrested under such a situation. (In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.)

In order that the most dangerous persons will be apprehended during a limited but grave emergency, there are set forth below the new standards to be used in deciding who should be listed for priority of apprehension and Detcon tabbing.

1. The Comsaab tabbing is to be discontinued.

2. Each Security Index subject should be considered for Detcon tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of the following categories:
   a. All Top Functionaries and Key Figures.
   b. Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:
      (1) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization.
      (2) Special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.
      (3) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men or active participation in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.
      (4) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities.
Subjects who will be tabbed Detcon should contain a hardcopy of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own and the decision to exclude a subject from Detcon or cancellation should be based on the subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies. Employment in a role of high security will no longer be a reason alone for Detcon tabbing.

In evaluating each Security Index case it will be necessary to review each case file. This should be done in connection with the review of all Security Index cases in accordance with the instructions in the pamphlet NCI Security Index dated 4/95. In submitting your personal recommendation for retaining a subject in the Security Index you should state your conclusion regarding the Detcon tabbing as indicated above along with your reasons why the subject meets the new Detcon standards in sufficient detail to enable your recommendation to be subject to review. Detcon and Comtab at this time and you are not recommending the Detcon tabbing in accordance with the above instructions you should submit a Form FD-122 attached to your report of recommendation in order to delete the Detcon and Comtab tabbing. If you are recommending the Detcon tabbing in accordance with the above instructions and the subject is already tabbed Detcon, you should so advise the Bureau and Form FD-122 need not be submitted. In instances in which you are recommending the Detcon tabbing and the subject is already tabbed Detcon and Comtab you should attach a Form FD-122 in order that the Comtab tabbing can be deleted. Of course, if the subject is not already tabbed Detcon and you are recommending such tabbing under the new instructions, you should attach a Form FD-122 to your Security Index recommendation in order that the Detcon tabbing can be added to the Security Index card.

There will be instances in which you have already submitted your recommendations that a Security Index subject should be retained in the Security Index. In those instances it will be necessary for you to recheck the individual case files to determine whether a Detcon tabbing is necessary and to advise the Bureau in accordance....

2/10/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-10
In order that the Security Index cards for the subjects who are to be tabbed Detcom for priority of apprehension, as indicated above, will be readily available for emergency action in your office you should be guided by the following instructions regarding the arrangement of your Security Index.

1. Each Security Index case should be considered for Detcom tabbing whether the subject's Security Index card is filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of your Security Index. However, there is no change being made in the instructions regarding the Security Index cards which are to be filed in those three sections.

2. The Geographical Section of your Security Index should be divided into two distinct parts. Part I of the Geographical Section shall include only the Security Index cards for subjects who aretabbed Detcom under the new instructions set out above. Part II of the Geographical Section will contain the Security Index cards for all subjects that are not tabbed Detcom.

3. In offices having a Geographical breakdown by residence and by employment it will be necessary to have two breakdowns for each of those categories in order that the cards tabbed Detcom will be separated and maintained apart from the cards not so tabbed.

4. You should continue to file one Security Index card for each subject in the Alphabetical Section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatever. To assist you in readily identifying Security Index cards in the Alphabetical Section that will be tabbed Detcom under the new instructions a colored metal box shall be fastened to each such card.

For your information, in the future as Detcom tabbings are approved the Security Index cards forwarded to you will not only carry the code letters DC in the first line on the cards but each such card will be stamped Detcom in large red letters. This procedure will assist you in being absolutely certain that cards tabbed Detcom are properly filled.

2/10/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12
The Detcom tabbing of a Security Index subject should be afforded your personal consideration and you should send your personal recommendations for such tabbing during these periods and to the extent this matter in connection with your review of all Security Index cases you should do the tabbing as set forth in SAC Letter 55-3 dated February 2, 1955. Security Index cards presently tabbed Detcom should not be closed in the new Detcom portion of the Geographical Section of your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations. There should be no changes made regarding the present Detcom tabbing in your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations under the new procedure. In this manner the entire Security Index will be reviewed and reconsideration given to Detcom tabbings by the periods indicated in SAC Letter Number 55-8.

In view of the new and separate breakdown in the Geographical Section of your Security Index for Detcom subjects it will no longer be necessary to place a separate tab on such cards as you have done in the past.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

2/10/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12